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Hizon: Virtual Reality and Reality

VIRTUAL REALITY AND REALITY:
THE EAST ASIAN NICS AND THE
GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM
ERNESTO M. HIZON*

When I tell any truth, it is not for the sake of
convincing those who do not know it,
but for the sake of defending those that do.
William Blake
It is difficult to get a man to understand
something when his salary depends upon
his not understanding it.
Upton Sinclair
History has always had the uncanny ability to reinvent itself.
The notion of history as an objective reality _. a collection or
thread of concrete facts and occurrences - is a dangerously
naive concept that lends itself to a counterfeit perspective of
reality. The history of a movement, or an idea, or a paradigm,
its progression, its development into norms of behavior, are
created by those who describe it, fashion its rules, define its
ethics. In sum, historical interpretations and their significance
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are formulated by those who write them, constructing a virtual
reality from a set of facts.
The history of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and its evolution into the World Trade Organization
(WTO) is a case in point. The outcome of the Uruguay Round
has been hailed as "a milestone for developing countries,"!
producing the "most fundamental reform of the world trading
system since the establishment of the [GATT] in 1947.')'2 It
must be borne in mind that although world trade has increased
with the GATT system in place for four decades, income
inequalities have remained, if not actually increased.
A World Bank publication has reported that, although world
exports grew at the compound annual rate of 12.7% from 1965
to 1990, the geographic pattern of trade has hardly changed
over the last quarter century. Developing countries as a group
accounted for 27% of world exports in both 1965 and 1988.
While the export share of several East and Southeast Asian
countries rose markedly within the non-oil exporting group of
developing countries, the export share of African and Western
Hemisphere developing countries declined significantly. By
1990 South Korea alone was exporting more than all of Africa.
Similarly, the share of industrial countries export remained
unchanged at about 73%, until the late 1990s.3 In practical
terms, this means that while the East Asian economies
progressed rapidly in the last twenty-five years, they merely
acquired a greater percentage of the developing country share
of the international trade pie. The industrial nations, which
comprise a smaller share of the world population,' maintained
their larger slice of the pie, as expected.
In contrast, the World Bank estimates that the Uruguay Round
is likely to generate as much as $200 billion a year in global
income, in absolute dollar terms, with somewhere between one

1. MICHAEL BRUNO, Foreword, in WILL MARTIN & L. ALAN WINTERS, THE
URUGUAY ROUND: WIDENING AND DEEPENING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (1995).

20
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I.MoDo LITTLE ET ALo, BOOM, CRISIS AND ADJuSTMENT: THE MACROECONOMIC
EXPERIENCE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 12, 13 (1993)0
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quarter to one half going to developing countries, particularly
to those which have relatively reduced their own protection.4
The same paper by the World Bank opines that the largest
gains from the Round will accrue to the East Asian WTO
members, pursuant to the liberalization commitments in
agriculture and manufactures, and the abolition of the MultiFiber Arrangement. 5
In an Overview Paper prepared· by the World Trade
Organization, Asian developing nations, as a group, have outperformed all the other developing countries by a wide margin
in terms of their share in world trade, particularly in the
manufacturing sector, which doubled by ten to twenty percent
since 1980. The same study also notes, in regard to developing
countries, a high correlation between their export performance
and the share of manufactured goods in their exports, as well
as a positive correlation between exports and the share of
investments in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and of
manufactures in GDP.6 Proving this point, while manufactures
account for more than eighty percent of total merchandise
exports for the East Asian developing countries (including
China), the corresponding share for other developing countries
is less than half the figure. 7 Between 1990 to 1996 alone, seven
of the ten fastest growing merchandise traders in the world
were East Asian Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs),8

4.
5.

Bruno, supra note 1, at 4, 5.
BRUNO, supra note 1, at 7.

6.
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, PARTICIPATION OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN
WORLD TRADE, OVERVIEW OF MAJOR TRENDS AND UNDERLYING FACTORS,

WT/COMTDIWI15, at 1- 2 (Note by the Secretariat, August 16, 1996).
7.
BRUNO, supra note 1, at 7.
8. The terms "East Asian NICs" (i.e. newly industrializing economies) and "NIEs"
(i.e. newly industrializing economies) have become part of the standard terminology of
economists, political scientists and legal experts to describe a group of rapidly growing
East Asian countries that roughly adhere to the so-called "East Asian economic
development model." Neither the GATT nor the Uruguay Round agreements define
what an NIC or NIE is. Suffice it to say that there is agreement that the NICs are a
group of countries in East Asia which, in terms of world economic development, are in a
transitional stage between the LDCs (Le. less developed countries) of the Third World,
and the AlCs (Le. advanced industrialized countries) of the West. They are also called
semi-industrial countries, middle-income major exporters, and emerging or transitional
economies.
The East Asian NICs are considered "new" simply because they have followed the
footsteps of Japan, which is the original postwar "newly industrializing" country.
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They are to be distinguished from the "old" countries such as the United States, and
the countries of Western Europe, which are the "old" or traditional First World
industrial countries.
The four original NICs -- Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea and Singapore -- have
also been nicknamed the "gang of four," or the "four little tigers." Depending on the
economic or developmental standards applied, other East Asian countries constitute a
second-tier of NICs -- which may include Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and to a lesser
extent, the Philippines. They are to be differentiated from the lower income developed
countries who have acquired a new category, the LLDCs (i.e. the less developed
countries).
There are basically two ways the NICs can be viewed from a political economy
standpoint: the comparative-static view or the dynamic-global definition. Under the
static view, the emergence of the NICs is an event that occurs in historical time and
demarcates the phenomenon of industrialization occurring after the Second World War.
See generally ANIs CHOWDHURY & IYANATUL ISLAM, THE NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZING
ECONOMIES OF EAST AsIA (1993). The other, more dynamic view treats the emergence
of the NIC as a change in the world production structure that corresponds to shifts in
the international division of labor. One expert writes, "These changes occur as a result
of a generalized historical movement in which industrialized countries vacate
intermediate sectors in industrial production in which advanced developing countries
are currently more competitive and advanced developing countries, in turn, vacate
more basic industrial sectors in which the next tier of developing countries have a
relative advantage." C.1. BRADFORD, JR., The Rise of the NICS as Exporters on a Global
Scale, in THE NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES: TRADE AND ADJuSTMENT (L. Turner
& N. McMullen eds., 1982). It is this more global definition that is implicitly used in
this article. For further elaboration of this theme from the political economy point of
view, see the other books by the same author: C. I. Bradford, Jr., NICs and the NextTier NICS as Transitional Economies, in TRADE AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN THE
PACIFIC AREA (C. Bradford, Jr. & W. Branson eds., 1987); C. I. Bradford, Jr., Trade and
Structural Change: NICs and the Next-tier NICs as Transitional Economies, 15:3
WORLD DEVELOPMENT 299.
Bela Balassa, in a pioneering World Bank study, defmed a roughly quantitative
view of the NIC: he classifies an NIC as one of the developing countries that had a per
capita income in excess of$I,100 in 1978 and whose share of the manufacturing sector
in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was about twenty percent or higher in 1977. BELA
BALASSA, The Newly Industrializing Countries after the Oil Crisis, WORLD BANK STAFF
WORKING PAPERS, No. 47/1980. This concept was later developed in B. BAlASSA, THE
NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (1981).
The Organization for Economic Development (OECD) in 1979 adopted five criteria
for defining an "NIE":
1. Fast growth since the 1960s;
2. High industrialization, with industrialization accounting for
a large proportion of GDP;
3. Fast growth in both the absolute level of industrial
employment and the share of industrial employment to total
employment;
4. A high export orientation, with a rising share of world
exports of manufactures;
5. Fast growth in real per capita GDP such that the country
was successful in narrowing the gap with the advanced industrialized
countries.
See OECD, THE IMPACT OF THE NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES ON
PRODUCTION AND TRADE IN MANUFACTURES (1979).
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including Malaysia, the Philippines, China,9 Thailand,
Singapore, South Korea and Indonesia.lO Among the top
twenty exporters in the world, seven are East Asian, including
Japan, Hong Kong, China, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan
and Malaysia. Thailand and Indonesia are also included in the
top thirty. It is important to note, in terms of world share of
manufactures in 1996, that Hong Kong has a higher share than
Belgium, and that South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan have
higher aggregate shares than Spain, Mexico, Switzerland,
Australia, Austria and even the Russian Federation. In the
lower tier of NICs, Thailand beats Ireland, and Indonesia
surpasses Norway, Denmark and Finland in terms of ranking
in world merchandise trade. l l
Before the East Asian downturn in July of 1997, the global
economy was expanding at an accelerated rate, and the
problem that many foresaw was one of too much growth. But
the latest East Asian economic crisis, which many were quick
to construe as a repudiation of the East Asian economic model,
makes a reappraisal of the evolution of the global trade order
and the present global trade order even more timely.
I.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE BASIC THESES

Since its inception, the GATTIWT0 12 "system" has produced a
gargantuan corpus of principles that have already crystallized
A simpler definition of an NIC is a country that has manufacturing sectors of a
similar relative size to those of industrialized countries. SHEILA PAGE, TRADE FINANCE
AND DEVEWPING COUNTRIES 4 (1990).
9. China is not technically an NIC in the strict sense because of its
predominantly socialist economy and much larger size, in comparison to the other
NICs.
10. World Merchandise Trade in 1996 by Region and by Leading Trader, WTO
International Trade <http://www.wto.org/wto/intltrad/iiworld.htm>.
11. [d. at Appendix l.
12. The basic legal texts for what can be collectively called the GATTIWTO system
can be found in the official publication of THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (1994).
This compendium includes, among others, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, the Multilateral Agreements on
Trade in Goods, the General Agreement on Trade in Services, the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, and the General Agreement on
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into some kind of "objective" doctrine, taking on a life of its
own. Reverence for .this mainstream thinking has eclipsed
many of the significant subtexts hidden in its historical
background, the broad repercussions of the 1994 Marrakesh
accord, and the far-reaching linkages proposed for the near
future between trade and non-trade related issues.
Encouraged in the ongoing analysis is a somewhat dogmatic
attitude toward its rules. Anything that deviates from this
particular installed set of principles is labeled either
economically inefficient, extremist or protectionist.
That melting pot of economically successful Asian NIC nations
is a cauldron in which the liberalizing thrust of international
trade (as defmed by the GATTIWTO "system"), together with
the phenomenal economic growth of this group of Asian
countries according to their own characteristic approach to
economic development, have formed a volatile mixture.
No doubt, the phenomenon called the "East Asian Miracle" has
benefited from the increased access in a liberalized trading
order. However, the commonly-held view that these countries
achieved their economic advance in large part by violating the
sacred canons of the GATT world order, and that they exploited
to the hilt the preferential treatment and exceptions accorded
to developing countries, is a totally disingenuous and
unrealistic notion. No member state of the GATT can be said
to be guiltless of skirting its restrictions when it suited their
economic needs. The double standard is the only balanced
standard in the interpretation of its historical context and
continuing development.
Admittedly, there can be no single perspective on the
development of the world trading system. The lopsided global
economic and political reality, however, has steered the

Tariffs and Trade of 1947. The aforementioned agreements are covered by this article,
while the following are excluded from its scope: the plurilateral trade agreements (Le.
those on trade in civil aircraft, government procurement, dairy and bovine meat
products); the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures; the agreement on
subsidies; issues relating to trade and environment; financial services as a specific
sector; maritime transport services; basic telecommunications; professional services;
and the Multi-Fiber Agreement.
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GATTIWTO framework in a certain direction, and has
consistently favored a perspective that fails to appreciate the
developing countries' experience with the system. With the
rise of the East Asian NICs, and paradoxically, with their
downfall, a clarification, or perhaps even a refutation of certain
accepted doctrines is in order. Five arguments are set forth in
this article, with many variations upon the themes elaborated
from various angles throughout, as the particulars of the WTO
agreements are discussed.
First, neither the GATT nor the WTO framework qualifies as a
true "system" in the sense of being a consistent, coordinated
and organized structure, whether formal or otherwise, that
aims to regulate international trade.
Due to numerous
derogations and exceptions to the fundamental principles it
espouses, whether within the WTO architecture or outside it,
the underlying driving force is still reciprocity and overriding
national or regional interests. The quid pro quo character of
the GATT is not completely altered by the more prominent
rule-based nature of the new WTO set of agreements. Recent
decisions of the Appellate Body, and the ever-increasing
number of panel reports, indicate that there is indeed a trend
toward the "rule of law" in trade disputes. However, the WTO
has yet to face the acid test of whether the developed countries,
once their fundamental trade interests are threatened, would
be willing to bow to the wishes of the Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB).
Second, the asymmetry in the economic and political
relationships between the developed and developing countries,
and the Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) which occupy
the middle ground between these two poles, has caused the
continuous rewriting and expansion of the international trade
rules according to the dynamic factors that affect the process of
globalization. This scenario is not helped any by the perpetual
question never satisfactorily answered: What is a Newly
Industrializing Country (NIC)? Does the onset of the East
Asian crisis neutralize any claim to being an NIC? In the real
world, the erstwhile dichotomy between a developed country
and a developing economy has become blurred; what has
evolved is a dynamic interaction between a relatively more
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developed country and a relatively less developed one. The East
Asian NICs have enjoyed the fruits of a globalized economy, at
least before the regional crisis, but this system has
marginalized other parts of the world, such as Africa and parts
of the Middle East. If globalization, using the paradigm of free
trade as the ideal, truly trickles down to even the poorest
states, then marginalization as it occurs today should not be
the case.
The endemic reVISIOn of the rules is largely based on the
changing competitive relationships between the entrenched
developed countries and the NIC "pretenders" to the economic
throne. With the bursting of the East Asian "bubble", the
future of the continued realignment of the rules to include,
among others, the expanded scope of the WTO rules on services
and the expiration of the grace period for developing countries
in the realm of intellectual property, may largely depend on
current economic needs, and paradoxically, a quid pro quo, ad
hoc approach to the WTO system.
Third, the peculiar impact of the East Asian "miracle" can be
considered as a major, if not the main impetus for the GATT's
gradually shifting orientation, from the reduction of tariffs and
goods, to an emphasis on services, intellectual property,
investments, environment and other non-trade related issues
such as labor standards, competition, social dumping and
corruption. The NICs were compelled to conform to this
mercantilistic drift because of the need to check the use of
protectionist measures exercised formally and informally
within and without the GATT framework. However, this
orientation consigns the _NICs, as well as the rest of the
developing world, to play an eternal game of "catch-up".
Without the Asian model in "catch-up" mode, the East Asian
region would have remained at the periphery of the then GATT
system. The NICs' emulation of Japan's success has spurred a
growth industry in the arsenal of trade protection instruments,
many of which remain in place, notwithstanding their
fundamental incompatibility with the spirit of the Uruguay
Round agreements. Thus, developing countries in East Asia
and Latin America (notably Brazil and Mexico) have resorted
to antidumping measures, which if examined closely, run
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contrary to the spirit of the free trade philosophy of the WTO.
Paradoxically, many of these measures, copied from their
Western legislative models, have targeted other developing
countries.
Fourth, despite the major improvements in the WTO
Agreements (especially in the area of dispute settlement), the
WTO body of rules remain a "patchwork quilt" of compatible
and incompatible obligations and arrangements, the
inconsistencies reflecting the changeable and perhaps still
tentative nature of the agreement.
What the Round
accomplished was the extension of the GATT disciplines to
agriculture, services, investment measures and intellectual
property, in some areas, but only to a limited extent. Although
the developments in these areas are more in the nature of
framework agreements than immediate reductions in
protection, the WTO tabula makes accessible a beachhead for
further concessions in these areas from the NICs.
The
Uruguay Round Agreements also offer a prelude to more farreaching proposals from the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, such as nontrade related linkages involving labor standards, human rights,
and children's rights.
Such proposals. reflect the OECD
countries' continuing discomfort and defensiveness in the face
of the dogged persistence of the East Asian, and to a lesser
extent, Latin American NICs.
Fifth, if there was the myth of the East Asian miracle, the new
myth is that of the East Asian debacle. Many critics of East
Asia forget that the region experienced fifteen years of high
growth - i.e. 8-10% per annum - largely· fuelled by the
confidence and investment of foreign investors. It was only in
the mid-1990s, in a burst of over-expansion, that excessive
borrowings occurred. Like it or not, the economic center of
gravity has shifted from the Atlantic to the Pacific,
notwithstanding Asian regional crisis and the birth of the Euro
in 1999. East Asia's sheer size alone guarantees its eventual
recovery.
In a sense, the East Asian economies were victims of their own
success. The East Asian economic crisis does not diminish the
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uniqueness and efficacy of the Asian model in international
commerce. The admirable values of the Chinese guanxi system
of business by family and personal relations, the consensual
leadership of the Malay mushawarah, the emphasis on the
extended family, education and the work ethic, were debased
by cronyism and corruption, the lack of checks and balances in
business dealings, and the abuses of public office by
government officials. In the absence of the so-called "Asian
values", the region would not have had the potential for high
growth. Asian values still exist and can thrive in the context of
the adjustments that have to be made as the region adjusts to
the stricter requirements of the global economy. Indeed, it will
be these values that help the countries to recover. The region
never spurned the concept of the "rule-of-Iaw" in the economic
order, which not infrequently was advanced by the naysayers
of the regional economic miracle. The institution of a level
playing field, and its integration in the economic, political and
social structure of the Asian NICs, requires time. It took the
West nearly two centuries to perfect its system that started
with the nineteenth century industrial revolution. Thus, it
would be unfair to judge the Asian Pacific region's performance
within a much more limited time frame.
This article proceeds from a particular vantagepoint, observing
the GATTIWTO system from the outside looking in, rather
than viewing its development purely from within. Many ideas
advanced here deviate from much of mainstream thinking. But
this "heretical" approach is imperative, if only to satisfy the
need to establish a different perspective.
In this study, the GATTIWTO "system" will first be
distinguished from the actual global trade regime as it
developed in the context of the emerging East Asian economies.
Next will follow a brief narrative history of the rise of the East.
Asian NICs from a less than idealistic perspective. With the
historical context in place, the article then delves into the
concept of "fairness" and the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism, placing the rules embodied in the procedure in
situational context vis-a-vis developing countries.
The
changing center of gravity within the system is then illustrated
by discussion of the WTO's shift in policy towards intellectual
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property and services. Finally, the article concludes with an
analysis of the recent East Asian economic crisis and its effect
on the global trading order.
II.

THE GATTfWTO AND THE GLOBAL TRADE REGIME13

A distinction should be drawn betweeri the GATTfWTO
"system" as it purports to be, and the actual global trade
regime that determines the conduct of international trade
relations between nations. The original conception of the
GATT was that all the contractual parties would conform to the
broad, non-discriminatory principles of Most Favored ~ation
(MFN) status and national treatment, as stated in Articles I
and III, respectively. The aim was to liberalize trade by
preventing discrimination between locally produced and
imported goods at national borders, as well as by seeking to
prevent discrimination against goods outside national borders.
At the same time, in a trade environment where tariffs were
high, the GATT embarked on its noble goal of reducing tariffs
by bindings agreed upon by the parties in a series of
negotiating rounds. To sum up, trade rules were agreed upon
multilaterally, theoretically amongst equal sovereigns.
The GATT was one of the postwar multilateral agreements
created to avoid the perilous exercise of mercantilism and
economic nationalism that lay at the roots of the conflict which
led to the world wars. The GATT was conceived as merely a
provisional understanding, when the Havana Charter of 1947,
which sought to erect a formal institutional structure - the
International Trade Organization (ITO) - to regulate the use
of trade-restricting measures in international commerce, failed
to be ratified. Hence the GATT, initially just a preliminary
step towards a more encompassing structure to regulate the

13.

The views expressed in this section may not conform to the mainstream view.

As far as the established orthodoxy is concerned, the main source is JOHN H. JACKSON,
ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS
AND TEXT ON THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL

ECONOMIC RELATIONS (3d ed. 1995). As for the European views, a recent work is
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw AND THE GATTIWTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM
(Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 1996).
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conduct of trade, became the core of the "value system"
envisioned to liberalize trade access.
Distilled into its conceptual essence, the GATTIWTO "system"
rests on two basic precepts: first, it is a rule-based system; and
second, under the MFN principle, all nations are to be treated
equally. As to the first postulate, various questions arise: Who
writes the rules? What particular aspects of international
trade do they cover? Do they favor one type or class of nations
over another? Do the rules allow nations to be treated equally
in the real or common sense, or are they merely treated equally
under the rules, as established? As to the second premise,
MFN can only achieve its objective, on the theoretical plane, if
all nations are on equal footing. Otherwise, the poorer nations
suffer due to equal treatment. Formally equal nations cannot
in fact perform or respond equally under the same set of
circumstances, since an open market system invariably enables
the stronger to prevail. As a consequence, the hypothetically
(or formalistically) rule-based system endures as a power-based
arrangement, in which the asymmetries in the relative
economic or political power of the actors determine the
complexion of their trade relationship.
This critique is not meant to disparage the virtue inherent in
the avowed objectives of the GATT and WTO. Without this
fundamental framework, the postwar momentum in economic
growth, especially for the Asian NICs, would not have occurred.
However, the naturally deleterious effects of MFN on the less
prosperous countries should at least be acknowledged. It must
be conceded that, under such circumstances, there never has
been, since the beginning of "GATT time" in 1947, nor can
there ever be, a "level playing field" in the international trade
environment. The "level playing field" paradigm, upon which
the MFN tenet is built, refers to an optim~ situation where
market forces objectively determine both resource allocation
and the distribution of rewards according to productivity.
However, this emphasis on distribution and productivity
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disregards the initial inequalities, and effectively rewards the
stronger. 14
This particular dimension should not be neglected or glossed
over by policy-makers and commentators. It is often argued
that contingent protection measures, "gray area" policies, and
unilateral defensive practices against "unfair trade" have been
instituted to level the playing field in the exchange of goods.
Such an argument is founded upon an illusion, since there can
never be a level playing field in international trade. It is
actually a hypocritical assertion, because those developed
nations who claim it refuse to accept that the imposition of an
MFN regime on flagrantly mismatched participants imposes
disadvantageous conditions on the weak. Lurking ominously
throughout is the danger that the desirable ''balancing of
interests" in such a system would be destabilized by the
imbalance of economic power resulting from the skewed
coverage of the rules. In this type of free trade context, the
weaker nations tend to suffer most of the time, despite
procedural and institutional safeguards aimed at protecting
them.
This discussion is rendered academic when one weighs the
nullifying effects of the numerous derogations to the basic
GATT principles. These exceptions have been formalized
through various informal arrangements, formal conventions
and bilateral agreements - all of which violate the letter and
spirit of the principles of non-discrimination, multilateralism
and transparency that the entire GATT scheme advocates. The
much-maligned General System of Preferences (GSP),
instituted for the benefit of developing countries, was no match
. for these exceptions - the special agreements in textiles (the
Multi-Fiber Agreement), agriculture (variable levy in the then
European Community), and manufactures (Voluntary Export
Restraints in footwear, electronics, automobiles, steel,
computer chips) - which were artfully targeted at commodities
exported by developing countries, and later, manufactures
produced by the NICs. These exclusions and deviations from

14.

DZAY MEHMET, WESTERNIZING THE THIRD WORLD 137 (1995).
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the general framework punctured the already fragile legal
framework sought to be created, since they pertain to specific
sectors that would allow the poorer countries a fighting chance
in the world market.
In the late 1980s, the emergence of unilateral trade measures
primarily affecting Japan and the East Asian NICs15 exemplified by the super 301 and special 301 provisions of the
Omnibus Trade Act of 1988 from the United States, and by
overzealous contingency protection such as slanted antidumping and countervailing duty determinations from the
European Community - made it distressingly clear that the
global trade regime really pursued a different set of rules from
those the GATT order exemplified. Not only are such measures
derogations of GATT precepts, but they contravene the very
structure of the liberal trading system.
The following
statement, written by a prominent international trade legal
scholar, would be valid if and only if the GATT were
synonymous with the global trade regime that actually controls
international commerce. Such is not the case. Note the
idealized notion of GATT as a code of legal obligations:
Finally, GATT law itself should probably be counted as a
source of support for the interest of developing countries. After
almost forty years, the GATT's code of legal obligations has
begun to acquire the respect of a legal system built on right on norms that command respect, not merely because they have
been paid for but also because they define correct and
responsible government behaviour. Time has also endowed
GATT obligations with a quality of law in the institutional
sense, so that GATT obligations now possess a certain amount
of respect-for-Iaw force independent of their substance. This
larger perception of GATT law can already be seen in the
handling of legal complaints brought by developing countries.

15. See Ernesto M. Hizon, Antidumping and the European Policy vis-a.-vis the East
Asian Newly Industrializing Countries, 18 J. WORLD COMPETITION 111 (1994).
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GATT law may be of only limited force, but it does seem to
cover the non-paying member. IS
It has also been suggested that regional trading arrangements,
despite their growing prominence in all of the world's regions,
likewise constitute derogations of GATT principles, and are
merely tolerated because they are a fact of life. To date,
neither the GATT nor WTO Secretariat has made any
categorical pronouncements as to whether these regional
arrangements - the most celebrated of which is the European
Union - are consistent with Article XXIV of the GATT
Agreement. The spreading inconsistency of the world trading
system has been described as an "erosion" of GATT principles.l7
Whether erosion in the system has benefited or harmed global
trade is not at issue here. A closer look at the proximate
causes for this erosion should be taken, an examination of why
measures were favored that departed from the GATT canons.
Certainly much of the ''backsliding'' from the ideal multilateral
system could be attributed to unforeseen economic
developments such as the oil shock of the seventies, the
recession of the eighties, and the East Asian economic crisis of
the nineties. As discussed below, it was the unanticipated,
rapid ascension, first of Japan, then of the East Asian NICs,
and subsequently of the second-tier NICs led by the ASEAN
countries, that provoked the gradual undermining of the
GATT.

16. ROBERT E. HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GAT!' LEGAL SYSTEM 190
(Trade Policy Research Centre 1987) (emphasis added).
17. John Whalley and Colleen Hamilton have described the global trading system
as having evolved into a "system architecture" with four distinct subsystems. JOHN
WHALLEY & COLLEEN HAMILTON, THE TRADING SYSTEM AFTER THE URUGUAY RoUND
23 (Institute for International Economics, 1996). This critique was earlier developed in
JOHN WHALLEY, The Uruguay Round and the GATT: Whither the Global System, in C.
FRED BERGSTEN & MARCUS NOLAND, PACIFIC DYNAMISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC SYSTEM 65 (Institute for International Economics 1993). See also H.B.
MALMGREN, Threats to the Multilateral System, in W.R. CLINE, TRADE POLICY IN THE
1980s (Institute for International Economics 1983); M. CAMPS & W. DIEBOLD, JR., THE
NEW MULTILATERALISM (Council on Foreign Relations 1986); J.H. JACKSON,
REsTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM, (Pinter for the Royal Institute of International
Affairs 1990).
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It cannot be overemphasized that the whole philosophy of
multilateralism and its institutionalization was initiated,
encouraged and more than occasionally, gently forced on the
others by the Western developed countries, mainly by the
United States and Europe. Yet, under assault by more
competitive products from the Far East, the very entities that
pushed the GATT agenda were ready to act in their own selfinterest by implementing trade policies contrary to GATT
principles. Authors have attributed this fall to the decline of
American economic and political hegemony, which dominance
had contributed to the stability and steady direction of the
global trading system in its first quarter of the twentieth
century. is The attention of U.S. decision-makers shifted from
the maintenance of a liberal international economic order to
the assertion of its commercial interests vis-a-vis its trade
partners. 19 With the weakening of US economic power in the
global economy, the liberal economic system, despite the
"progression" of the WTO, is always in jeopardy.

. The erstwhile lower income (NIC) countries, which managed to
progress within the constraints of the lopsided economic
relationships in the postwar era, have always been the
scapegoats for the deterioration of the GATT system. While it
is true that many NICs were guilty of infringing the GATT
rules, mostly out of the need to hurdle their economically
disadvantaged positions, the contingency protection schemes,
farm subsidies, Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs), and
Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA) instituted by much of the
developed world, constituted even larger scale aberrations from
the GATT framework.
The anti-dumping measures in Article VJ20 of the GATT,
carried over to the Uruguay Round agreements, were

18. See R.O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE
WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984); Jagdish Bhagwati, The Diminished Giant
Syndrome, 72 FOR. AFF. 2, 22-26 (1993).
19. GAVIN BOYD, STRUCTURING INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION 51
(1991).
20. The primary difference between the GATT Article VIfl'okyo Round Code rules
on anti-dumping and the Uruguay Round provisions on anti-dumping is the presence of
additional procedural requirements to ensure, in theory, that anti-dumping is not
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sophisticated trade protection measures employed by developed
countries against the export manufactures of the developing
countries, particularly the East Asian NICs. Hugo Paemen,
the European Union's chief negotiator in the Uruguay Round,
declared that dumping "is unfair by nature." He continued, "if
a period of selling at a loss forms part of an export strategy
aimed at wiping out the competition in the target market,
GATT quite reasonably and quite properly allows
countermeasures.'>2l
However, an NIC export strategy coupled with government
policies that aimed to increase their countries' share of
manufactures to their overall GDP could not materialize if
their economies depended entirely on their small domestic
markets. Thus, expanding the share of their foreign target
markets was the main impetus to their accelerated growth. If
no form of domestic market protection were implemented, then
the NICs would have remained primary producers and would
have severely limited their options to jumpstart their
economies. EU and U.S. anti-dumping determinations against
products from NICs reduced the export onslaught and allowed
domestic producers to fend off foreign competition, or gave
them time to regroup and improve the competitiveness of their
products. 22

abused. See David Palmeter, A Commentary on the WTO Anti-Dumping Code, 30 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 4, 43-69 (1996). See also Gary N. Horlick & Eleanor C. Shea, The
World Trade Organization Antidumping Agreement, 29 J. WORLD TRADE L. 1, 5-31
(1995).
21. HuGO PAEMEN & ALEXANDRA BENSCH, FROM THE GATT TO THE WTO·· THE;
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN THE URUGUAY ROUND 158 (1995).
22. There is a large body of writing on anti-dumping laws, although one's opinion
of them depends on which side you are on. The most recent major texts are: ANTIDUMPING LAw AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (John H. Jackson & Edwin
Vermulst eds., 1991); EDWIN VERMULST & PAUL WAER, EC ANTI-DUMPING LAw AND
PRACTICE (1996). The basic, original work on dumping is JACOB VINER, DUMPING: A
PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1991). Older general works that contain sections
on dumping are: JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAw OF GATT (1969);
KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAw AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION
(1970); J.F. BESELER & AN. WILLIAMS, ANTI-DUMPING AND ANTI-SUBSIDY LAW: THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1986); ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAw: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM (1993).
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In the rules embodied in the GATT 1947 and the Tokyo Round
Code, the reality of dumping in was obfuscated by the mass of
technicalities created by the implementation of anti-dumping
by national jurisdictions, notably the European Community
countries and the United States. The same holds true under
the even more stringent and complex anti-dumping rules
contained in the Uruguay Round agreements.23
Dumping,
which is simplistically defined as selling goods in the foreign
market at a price lower than at the price it is sold in the
domestic market, does not require any determination that
competition in the foreign market be "wiped out" and
effectively impaired. 24 All it requires is a finding of the
lopsided price differential between the price sold in the local
market and the export market. 25

23. Palmeter, supra note 20, at 68.
24. There is a growing movement on the part of trade economists and
international trade lawyers to eliminate anti-dumping laws altogether and replace
them with antitrust and competition laws. This theme has been written about in a
number of papers, among them: Jorge Miranda, Should Antidumping Laws be
Dumped?, 28 LAw & POL'y INT'L Bus. 255; Patrick Messerlin, Should Anti·Dumping
Rules Be Replaced by National or International Competition Rules?, 18 WORLD
COMPETITION 37 (1994); Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, Dumping,
Antidumping and Antitrust, 30 J. WORLD TRADE 27 (1996).
25. An extended analysis of anti-dumping is pursued here. However, Article 17. of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement in the Uruguay Round agreements contains provisions
on standards of review that may affect the conduct of anti-dumping cases filed with the
WTO Dispute Settlement system, and ultimately, affect the products of the East Asian
NICs -- against which a majority of these cases are filed. Since the WTO dispute
settlement procedure is a global system, the disputes arising under the Anti-Dumping
Agreement are to be resolved in accordance with the procedure outlined in the Dispute
Settlement Understanding. Article 17:6(I) provides, with respect to the review of the
facts regarding the dumping determination, that "[iln its assessment of the facts of the
matter, the panel shall determine whether the authorities' establishment of the facts
was proper and whether their evaluation of those facts was unbiased and objective. If
the establishment of the facts was proper and the evaluation was unbiased and
objective, even though the panel might have reached a different conclusion, the
evaluation shall not be overturned."
In other words, the standard of review of the dumping determinations by national
authorities shall be restricted only to whether they were "proper," "unbiased" and
"objective." This narrow scope limits the power of the WTO dispute settlement panel,
and possibly, the Appellate Body, as the case may be, to initiate a wholly new review of
the facts. In essence, it is largely dependent on, and defers to a great extent to the
determinations of the national authorities, who would certainly be inclined to make a
determination of dumping, if their national interest so dictates. While this may codify
existing GATT Panel practice, it consolidates the position of the countries wield the
anti-dumping measures. Thus, although there are procedural safeguards that might
protect the disadvantaged parties, notably the parties against which anti-dumping
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No WTO member state can claim any measure of innocence,
since they have always fallen back on pragmatic considerations
when the virtues of multilateralism and nondiscrimination
were absent in concrete situations. In pari delicto, so to speak.
Deviations from GATT postulates should be deemed deviations,
regardless of what they may be called. Perversity reaches its
apex when it advocates of unilateral trade measures claim that
Section 301 of the U.S. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act actually liberalizes trade by helping open markets not only
for the United States, but for the rest of the world as well?6

In practice, the global trade regime is a "bi-polar" but
synchronous system, in which there exists, on the one hand, a
legalistic, formal structure of trade rules that flow from the
evolved GATTIWTO tenets, and on the other hand, a neomercantilist, non-formal trade policy architecture that is
defmed by the asymmetric economic, historical, regional and
political relationships between the member states.
The
seeming harmony of the international trade regime is a legal
mirage perpetuated by the attractive unity of the GATTIWTO

cases are filed, the limited standard of review diminishes their options once a contrary
ruling has been issued.
For a lengthy overview of the anti-dumping ''jurisprudence'' of the GATI'IWTO
system, see Edwin Vermulst & Norio Komuro, Anti·Dumping Disputes in the
GATTIWTO, Navigating Dire Straits, 31 J. WORLD TRADE L. 1, 5-33 (1997); Edwin
Vermulst, Adopting and Implementing Anti·Dumping Laws, Some Suggestions for
Developing Countries, 31 J. WORLD TRADE L. 2, 5-23 (1997).
26. See, e.g., GREG MAsTEL, AMERICAN TRADE LAws AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND
(1996). Some of the arguments in this book can be aptly characterized as "cowboy
trade diplomacy" that gives carte blanche to the U.S. Government to decide whether a
trade practice is fair or unfair, to be punished through multilateral or unilateral
means. To illustrate with an excerpt:
There will still be cases that cannot be pursued through
multilateral institutions, either because the target country involved is
not a party to the new WTO or because the issue to be addressed is
not covered by the WTO. A number of major trading countries remain
outside the WTO and are likely to remain so for some time. Trade
problems that are increasingly recognized as serious commercial
problems, including private-sector collusion and forced technology
transfer, are also beyond the scope of the WTO. In these cases, the
United States will be faced with a simple choice: either act
unilaterally or be prepared to tolerate the unfair practice. In those
cases in which a multilateral ''judge and jury" is simply unavailable,
unilateral action under Section 301 remains the only solution.

Id. at 54.
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corpus of principles, and more significantly, by the fact that it
is interpreted from a single perspective. All participants in the
process, whether from the developed world, or from the
developing countrylNIC group, weave back and forth between
these two contrasting cultures, depending on short-term or
long-term policy goals.
In a nutshell, the GATTIWTO
framework is valuable when it is useful?7
As a whole, the WTO Agreements are a continuation, rather

than a reversal, of this trend toward fragmentation of the
global trading regime. The term "fragmentation" is used here
not to denote a reversal of the propensity toward trade
liberalization, but rather, to describe the lingering piecemeal
structure of the trade regime. The architecture of the WTO
framework prevails as an assortment of trade arrangements
mirroring once more the quid pro quo context of the entire
negotiating process, and its final result. While in theory, the
underlying philosophy of the multilateral trading order, then
and now, is one of non-reciprocity, with economic welfare
advantages outweighing political considerations, reciprocity in
the multilateral trade order, and not just in the multilateral
negotiations, has never departed from the global trading
configuration. Weaker countries in the system, while cognizant
of the benefits of liberalized trade, cannot afford to sail against
the winds of the dominant philosophy because of the
concurrent but contradictory parallel universe that endures
with the WTO system.

27. It can also be argued that there are also two competing, incompatible strains
within the GAT!' structure. "Existing parallel to the illusory rule/power distinction in
the appreciation of GAT!' law is the myth that the GAT!' promotes only the
liberalization of trade. Peculiar to the GAT!' orientation is the forced marriage of
liberal and mercantilistic components ... , creating internal contradictions in the entire
GATT system as a whole. An economist has rightly dubbed this coupling the
'liberalization-mercantilism' syndrome. The GATT supports a legal structure composed
of provisions ensuring the liberalization of trade, but at the same time, allows
numerous exceptions nullifying each of these fundamental principles. These fatal
protectionist 'qualifiers' neutralize the liberalizing thrust of the GAT!' and encourage
participating states to more, rather than less protectionism." Ernesto M. Hizon, The
Safeguard Measure / VER Dilemma: The Jekyll and Hyde of Trade Protection, 15 Nw J.
INT'L L.& Bus. 105, 121 (1994).
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The Uruguay Round came to a successful photo finish
primarily because of the fear that the failure of the Round
would result in a splintering of the world into three giant
trading blocs in Europe, the Americas and East Asia. In the
end, the final document depended on a break in the deadlock
between the United States and Europe, with compromises in
contentious areas such as agriculture, textiles and the film
industry.
From all indications, the conclusion of the Uruguay Round
forecasts interminable negotiations that go beyond the scope of
the concluded agreement.
The battle lines between the
developing world, the NICs, and the developed countries are
once again drawn by the unyielding rush of proposals to
include linkages between trade and formerly non-trade related
issues such as the environment, labor standards, government
corruption, anti-competitive practices, business practices
(keiretsu in Japan, chaebol in Korea), child labor, and to a
lesser extent, human rights. At the first WTO Ministerial
conference held in Singapore in December of 1996, the cleavage
between the developing countries and NICs, on the one hand,
and the developed countries, on the other hand, over the
subject of linkages was felt. As a compromise the Singapore
Declaration issued statements that the member states would
work toward a resolution of these issues, but did not go far
enough to establish ground rules that would directly link trade
with non-trade issues.28
The Darwinian rule of the fittest and strongest in the WTO
world could once more come into play. Plainly stated, these
proposals are essentially designed, in the words of the former
Director of Legal Affairs of the GATT, "to permit trade.
restrictions designed to facilitate or promote a change in
domestic policies in these areas.,,29

28.
29.

14 WTO Focus (December 1996).
Frieder Roessler, Diverging Domestic Policies and Multilateral Trade
Integration, in ROBERT E. HUDEC, FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION, PREREQUISITES
FOR FREE TRADE?, Vol. 2 LEGAL ANALYSIS 21, 36 (1996).
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III. THE MALIGNED NIC STIMULUS
It is imperative to bear in mind that the GATT rules were
written in the context of the postwar economic situation, and
presumed a particular economic hierarchy of nations, in which
the competitive positions of each were starkly differentiated.
The emergence of the NICs and the unfolding of their unique
design on development wrecked havoc on the fragile balance of
trade obligations that had arisen from the specific postwar
economic milieu. Trade liberalization in the form of lower
tariffs and vigilant non-discrimination in the exchange of
goods, under the same GATT rules, would not have been
sufficient to hold the NIC advance in check.
East Asia's trade surpluses with the rest of the world
contrasted with the slow growth among the OECD member
countries. In the nineties, the global economy slowed down
considerably. Only the East Asian economies were able to
maintain high growth rates, although these were also affected
by the global slowdown, since much of East Asia's trade is
extra-regional. In the fmal quarter of the twentieth century,
East Asian exports rose more than thirty fold to about $850
billion, and its share of world exports from seven to twenty-one
percent. Some countries with trade deficits orchestrated
increases in dumping determinations and negotiated voluntary
export restraints to bypass the GATT proscription on
quantitative restrictions, while others, such as the U.S.,
instituted special laws that authorized retaliation against
countries practicing "unfair trade".
These contingency
measures were primarily aimed at the East Asian NICs, whose
export manufacturing drives continued their momentum, and
had relatively protected domestic markets.30
The world economy has changed dramatically since the genesis
of the liberal world trade system. At the GATT's birth, the
world was just recovering from a traumatic war, and it was
hoped that with the installation of a liberalized trading order,

30.

THE WORLD BANK, EAST AsIA'S TRADE AND INVESTMENT 2-5 (1994).
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the economic seeds of conflict would be minimized, if not
eliminated altogether. The postwar era also spelled the end of
colonialism, and thus the gradual independence of erstwhile
colonies of the Western powers slowly enlarged the GATT's
membership. However, the political and economic divisions of
the world were striking:
the developing countries were
guileless bystanders in the development of GATT's rules and
were uncomfortably trapped in the vicious cycle of merely
providing commodities and raw materials for the industries of
the West.
It is a commonly held belief that the early years of the postwar

trading system provided developing countries more favorable
treatment in the GATT. Perhaps from a strictly legalistic and
amoral point of view, this may be so. The principles of the New
International Economic Order (NIEO), a "soft-law" obligation
to respect the right to· economic development, became the
philosophical infrastructure for the General System of
Preferences (GSP) under which preferential and non-reciprocal
treatment towards developing countries was recognized.31
But this myopic, or even rose-colored perspective obscures the
historical and economic context altogether.
Preferential
treatment was willingly granted in sectors that posed no
threat, or that were even beneficial to the domestic industries '
concerned. 32 Under the GATT, and the WTO, members have
the right to voluntarily give tariff preferences to developing
countries. 33 Since these preferences are accorded on an
autonomous basis, they could be withdrawn at any time in
whole or in part, or conditions that may be trade or non-trade
related, may be attached to them. There is nothing a donee

31. Although the GSP was incorporated into the GAT!', it was granted by
individual countries in the nature of a voluntary contractual obligation, with no
pretense of being a defInite obligation under customary international law. No legal
theory was formulated to determine the specifIc rights and duties under GSP. See
HUDEC, supra note 16, at 186-196.
32. HUDEC, supra'note 16, at 189.
33. Decision of the Contracting Parties to GAIT of 28 November 1979 on

Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of
Developing Countries, 26 BISD 203 (1990).
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nation could do that could prevent the donor country from
linlring preferential treatment with certain domestic policies.34
For some developing countries, such as the African, Caribbean
and Pacific (ACP) former colonies of the European Union
nations, special treatment under the Lome Convention's ACP
Preferential Agreements was a stimulus to continue supplying
primary commodities to their former colonial masters. This
trapped them into the comfort of lingering dependency.35 But
once these preferences allowed certain imports to compete
effectively with domestic firms, then the preferences were cut
off by "graduating" the entitled imports or by arresting their
onslaught by tightening contingency protection. In both cases,
developing countries would be foolhardy to threaten retaliation
available to them even under the GATT rules, as their weaker
economic position and smaller markets would be no match for a
potentially dangerous response from developed countries. In
the end, it is still the relative strategic economic circumstances
of trading countries that determine the use of the GATT legal
superstructure.
IV. A BRIEF HISTORY FROM THE EAST ASIAN NIC
PERSPECTIVE
In cold, objective terms, the world in 1947 at the inception of
GATT, was divided into the "haves" and "have-nots". In the
1950s, the economic structures of the developing countries were
sadly alike. Adopting policies that were direct interventions of
private economic activity, the developing nations were not only
poor, with low savings and employment rates, but productivity
and wages were low, and credit was scarce. While the
developing countries' share of world GNP fell, the OECD
economies were growing at a fast clip.
In the late 1950s and in the 1960s, some developing countries,
notably those in East Asia, moved from primary commodity

34. Roessler, supra note 29, at 39-40.
35. See EUROPEAN TRADE POLICIES AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD (L.B.M. Mennes
& J. Kol eds., 1988).
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exporters to import-substitution industrialization, which
created incentives for production in the domestic market by
protecting local "infant industries". However, this strategy
proved detrimental to overall growth by causing inefficiencies
in obtaining materials, entrenching domestic monopolies and
limiting the size of the market. 36 Foreign exchange rates were
overvalued in the guise of preventing shortages of the precious
foreign currency. Productivity lagged and export growth
slowed. This evolution from land-intensive to labor-intensive
production was followed by a move to an export-oriented
industrialization policy. This shift required the formation of
more capital-intensive industries and the targeting of
international markets over the domestic market.37
The countries that switched to more export-oriented policies,
particularly those in East Asia, found significant increases in
their output, employment and productivity. Foreign exchange
rates were brought down to more realistic levels, and access to
intermediate goods and raw materials was facilitated.
Incentives were instituted for a wide variety of goods,
especially for exportable commodities and manufactures.
Although the rapid economic expansion of the world economy
at this time did not cause as much dislocation as it would have
in a period of lower growth, the export promotion policies of
some of the developing countries made them significant
competitors for manufactures in the international market.3s

36. Critics of the infant-industry assumptions have argued that once government
begins to intervene in favor of import-competing industries, every failing industry
would seek government aid. This, however, did not occur in the case of the successful
East Asian economies, which diverted to an export-based market-drive
industrialization.
Article XVIII of the GATT permits special infant-industry
protection, but it requires a GATT review of the economic justification. Because of the
cumbersome process, the provision has been hardly used. Developed countries have
not often resorted to requiring the compliance with Article XVIII due the "seeming
impossibility of the task." Developing countries have simply tried to evade it. See
HUDEC, supra note 16, at 172.
37. See Tan..Jun Cheng, Political Regime and Development Strategies: South /Wrea
and Taiwan, in MANuFACTURING MIRACLES: PATHS OF INDUSTRIALIZATION IN LATIN
AMERICA AND EAST AsIA (Gary Gereffi & Donald Wyman eds., 1990).
38. ANNE O. KRUEGER, PERSPECTIVES ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 363-367
(990).
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The rising import of manufactures affected the labor-intensive
industries in developed countries, although the evidence shows
that most of these difficulties would have been present anyway.
Increased protection from developed country markets did not
substantially reduce the growth of imports from less developed
countries (LDCs),39 except for textiles and apparel. An open
trading system was essential for the export strategies of the
LDCs. In this sense, the fortunes of the successful developing
countries were intimately related to the continuing economic
advancement of the developed countries and the severity of
their protectionist measures.40
In the 1970s,· the first-tier East Asian NICs upgraded their
manufacturing to higher value-added products, conceding the
labor-intensive, low-wage manufacturing sector to the secondtier East Asian NICs, led by the ASEAN countries.41 The
ASEAN countries more or less followed the same pattern as the
first-tier countries, with the notable exception of Singapore,
which did not pursue an import-substitution policy because of
its small domestic market while. While ASEAN countries were
initially primary commodity exporting countries coming out of
colonialism, their manufactures exceeded commodities by the
mid-1980s, except for oil-exporting Indonesia and Brunei.42
The sharp rise of the Japanese yen and the New Taiwan dollar
in the latter half of the1980s, sparked a round of first-tier NIC
investment In the lower-cost ASEAN NIC economies,43
39. See H. Hughes & A.O. Krueger, Effects of Protection in Developed Countries on
Developing Countries' Exports of Manufactures, in AMERICAN TRADE RELATIONS (R.
Baldwin & A.O. Krueger eds., 1984).
40. KRUEGER, supra note 38, at 374-375.
41. See CHOWDHURY & ISLAM, supra note 12, at 1-56.
42. A wide range of articles and books discuss the Southeast Asian economic
success story, particularly the shift from commodity exports to manufacturing. See, e.g.
Linda Y.C. Lim, Southeast Asia: Success Through International Openness, in GLOBAL
CHANGE, REGIONAL RESPONSE 238-271 (Barbara Stallings ed., 1995); EXPORT-LED
INDUSTRIALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT (Eddy Lee ed., Maruzen Asia for the
International Labour Organisation 1981); EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES AND INDUSTRIAL
EMPLOYMENT IN AsIA (Eddy Lee ed., Asian Employment Programme of the
International Labour Organisation 1984); MOHAMMED ARIFF & HAL HILL, EXPORTORIENTED INDUSTRIALIZATION: THE ASEAN EXPERIENCE (1985), cited in Stallings,

supra.
43. See FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN ASEAN (Soon Lee Ying ed., Malaysian
Economic Association 1990); PASUK PHONGPAICHIT, THE NEW WAVE OF JAPANESE
INVESTMENT IN ASEAN: DETERMINANTS AND PROSPECTS (Institute of Southeast Asian
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especially in industries like consumer electronics and
household appliances. Similarly affected European companies
also shifted some of their manufacturing· to the ASEAN
countries.44
The inroads made by the East Asian NICs into the developed
country markets spurred a wave of protectionism. The two
fundamental principles of the GATT trading system, nondiscrimination and multilateralism, were threatened with the
spread of bilateralism, the demand for reciprocity and
differential treatment. 45 From the 1970s and into the 1980s,
bilateral orderly marketing arrangements (OMAs) and VERs
targeted products from Japan and the East Asian NICs.46
The second half of the 1980s saw a transformation of trade
policy on the part of the OECD countries. The United States
led the way by shifting its emphasis from ad hoc bilateral
agreements to more concrete measures to stem the threat from
the East Asian NICs.
The 1988 Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act defined a broad range of "unfair" trade
practices, and mandated the U.S. Trade Representative to take
punitive measures against the violators under Section 301 of
the Act and Super 301. 47 One of the more recent GATT Trade
Policy Reviews reported that nine of the thirteen active cases
between July 1991 and June 1993 were directed against
developing countries, and that eight of them concerned
intellectual property rights. 48
From this point on, the United States emphasized the
protection of intellectual property rights, advocated the

Studies 1990); DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN AsIA'S DEVELOPING ECONOMIES AND
STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN THE AsIA-PACIFIC REGION (Eric D. Ramstetter ed. 1991); LINA
Y.C. LIM & PANG ENG FONG, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND INDUSTRIALISATION IN
MALAYSIA, SINGAPORE, TAIWAN AND THAILAND (OECD Development Centre 1991).
44. Lim, supra note 42, at 251.
45. See Beth Yarbrough & Robert Yarbrough, Cooperation in the Liberalization of
International Trade: After Hegemony, What?, 41 INT'L ORG. (1987).
46. See Vinod Aggarwal, et aI., The Dynamics of Negotiated Protectionism, 81 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 2 (1987).
47. Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act has been amended many times, most
recently by the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, 19 U.S.C. §2411.
48. GATT, 1 TRADE POLICY REVIEW 3 (1994).
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enlargement of the scope of the GATT to services, and sought
the removal of non-tariff barriers to trade. In 1989, the U.S.
graduated the East Asian NICs from their less-developed
country status by removing their privileges under the GSP
system. As Japan turned its attention to Asia in the 1990s and
increased its investments there, Western observers were
increasingly worried that Japan's example would encourage
the rest of the region to adopt its formula of export-led growth
and barriers to imports. 49
Due to the emergence of the East Asian NICs, the so-called
North-South dichotomy that also divided East from West, has
disappeared. Economic interdependence has increased, even as
the political divisions and ideologies in the world have
decreased. Within the OECD club, as well as within the circle
of third world countries, there is rapidly growing
differentiation. For instance, the average per capita GDP of
the East Asian NIC has exceeded $8,000· (i.e. more than that of
some European nations), while the nations in sub-Saharan
Mrica have a per capita' GDP of only $800. Indeed, the term
"Third World" that was used to represent the fraternity of
developing countries at the start of the GATT system has
become anachronistic.50
The "East Asian Miracle" has
expanded the role of developing countries in the world trading
system, and has both directly and indirectly shaped its future.
The near parity in economic levels has been accomplished by
means of vastly dissimilar approaches to development. It is
this ideological Scylla and Charybdis in tactics that leads to
disputes in international trade. This strategic divergence could
also be said to have greatly influenced the reactive course
subsequent international trade negotiations would take.

49. Japan's New Identity, Bus. WEEK, April 10, 1995, at 112. This article
reported the Deutsche Bank's estimate that in 1994, Japan's direct investment in East
Asia totaled $64 billion as against the United States' $26 billion and $7 billion from
Germany. In 1993, East Asia took 36% of Japan's exports, while the U.S. had only
17%, and Germany and France, less than 10% each.
50. Barbara Stallings, The New International Context of Development, in GLOBAL
CHANGE, REGIONAL RESPONSE, supra note 42, at 349.
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Asian models of development relied on institutional steps to
promote exports, making full use of industrial policy to promote
certain sectors of the economy. These measures included inter
alia subsidized credit, government assistance with marketing
strategies, and access to imported technology, all in the context
of a protected domestic market. The Asian strategy invested
heavily in the growth of human capital and physical facilities.51
Aside from the Western democracies, only the East Asian NICs
have overcome the barriers to development. A thoughtprovoking study of the East Asian high-performing economies'
(HPEs) developmental model attributes their performance to
the principle of "shared growth": the building of a broad,
legitimating consensus between government, business
community and citizenry in the shaping of economic policy
toward rapid economic growth. Since each of the constituent
groups are granted bargaining power in exchange for
information to formulate rational economic policies, long-term
economic goals could be effectively implemented.52
In its World Development Report 1991, the World Bank

expanded on the neoclassical interpretation of East Asia's
phenomenal success by underscoring effective but carefully
limited government activism. In this market-friendly strategy,
government's role is to ensure adequate investment in human
resources, furnish incentives for the private sector, keep an
open economy for international trade, and maintain a stable
macroeconomic environment. Interventions should be marketfriendly in order to be beneficial. In its study of the policies of
developing economies, the World Bank concludes that nonmarket mechanisms to guide resource allocation were in fact
detrimental to economic development.53

51. See WORLD BANK, THE EAST AsIAN MIRACLE: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PuBuc
POUCY (1993) [hereinafter THE EAST AsIAN MIRACLE]; WORLD BANK, WORLD
DEVELOPMENT REPORT (1991). See also JOSE EDGARDO CAMPOS & HILTON L. RooT,
THE KEy TO THE AsIAN MIRACLE, MAKING SHARED GROWTH CREDIBLE (The Brookings
Institution, 1996).
52.
CAMPOS & RooT, supra note 52.
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 51.
53.
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In its path-breaking 1993 report on the East Asian Miracle,54
the World Bank describes the carefully managed state
interventions that complemented the policy of maintaining
macroeconomic fundamentals by the East Asian NICs.55 These
selective mechanisms, which addressed "coordination failures"
in the working of markets, include mild fmancial repression
(e.g., keeping interest rates low), directed credit, selective
industrial promotion, and trade policies that push
nontraditional exports.
These pragmatic, flexible policy
instruments were responses that promoted cooperative
behavior among private firms and set· performance-based
standards for success. A strong institutional framework - a
highly qualified and apolitical civil service - enhanced the
ability to monitor performance in such a "controlled"
competitive environment.56 However, export subsidies and
54. THE EAST AsIAN MIRACLE, supra note 51.
55. Among the macroeconomic fundamentals mentioned by the World Bank are
high investments in human capital, a stable and secure fmancial system, limited price
distortions, and openness to foreign technology. THE EAST AsIAN MIRACLE, supra note
51.
56. THE EAST AsIAN MIRACLE, supra note 51, at 10-11. The World Bank Report
further elucidates on the argument of cooperative behavior and competitive discipline
in this way:
Competitive discipline is crucial to efficient investment. Most
economies employ only market-based competition. We argue that
some HPAEs (Highly Performing Asian Economies) have gone a step
further by creating contests that combine competition with the
benefits of cooperation among firms and between government and the
private sector. Such contests range from very simple non-market
allocation rules, such as access to rationed credit for exporters, to very
complex coordination of private investment in the governmentbusiness deliberation councils of Japan and Korea. The key feature of
each contest, however, is that the government distributes rewards -often access to credit or foreign exchange .- on the basis of
performance, which the government and competing firms monitor.
To succeed, selective interventions must be disciplined by competition
via either markets or contest.
It should be clarified at this point, however, that while the Bank Report advances
this framework to interpret data on the East Asian NICs, it acknowledges differences
in the way each of the NICs made use of this general approach for its own
macroeconomic policies. For example, the first-tier NICs represented by Korea,
Taiwan, and Singapore, emulating Japan in the 1950s and 1960s, first went through a
phase of import-substitution before they shifted to a pro-export regime that co-existed
with a moderate but highly variable protection of the domestic market. Hong Kong,
being a laissez faire state from time immemorial, always had a strong bias in favor of
exports.
In the case of the second-tier NICs led by the Southeast Asian states
Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia, and lately, the Philippines, the export push in the
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directed-credit programs linked to exports, which required
highly directed institutional interventions, were deemed
inconsistent with the GATT framework and often invited
retaliation from the industrial country members.57
Anne Krueger summarized the East Asian experience when
. she described the phenomenon of East Asian growth "as arising
out of the use of the international economy to enable the
country rely on comparative advantage in allocating
resources.,,58 It was the external economic conditions that
compelled the East Asian NICs to practice state intervention
and macroeconomic management to compete effectively in the
world markets, and later, to liberalize their economies to
respond to the changes in the global market. There was
nothing inherently unique in the East Asian success story; the
essential ingredients avoidance of price and trade
distortions, combined with macroeconomic stability - can be
copied by other developing countries. What sets the East Asian
experience apart is the "effective blending of the roles of
market and state" that makes it possible to get the most out of
its trade reforms and public expenditures.59
The NICs' policy orientations, rather than a conscious effort to
skirt international trade rules and exploit preferential
treatment, were in the nature of necessary "mediated
responses" determined by factors that were necessary to adjust
to the existing economic environment. Certainly the NICs
would never have been able to improve their competitiveness in
the world market had they not been able to promote exports
initially by shielding their local market. They would have been
eternally ensconced in the primary commodity or import
substitution phase of their economic development.
1980s, was accompanied by less state interventions and relied and more broadly based
market incentives and direct foreign investment.
[d. at 12-13.
57. [d. at 25.
58. ANNE O. KRUEGER, TRADE POLICIES AND DEVELOPING NATIONS 25 (The
Brookings Institution 1995).
59. VINOD THOMAS & YAN WANG, THE LESSONS OF EAST AsIA, GoVERNMENT
POLICY AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH, Is EAST AsIA AN EXCEPTION'? 18 (The World Bank
1993).
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The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) Report on the implications of the Uruguay Round
agreements for the trade and development policies of
developing countries presents the balanced view of the East
Asian development model:
In addition to sound macroeconomic policies, successful
countries have used a number of selective policies and
measures to influence the direction and level of investment, to
increase .profitability of exports, to provide incentives for
accumulating technological capabilities, to promote technology
transfer to domestic enterprises and to reduce risks of
exporting firms. In this context, these countries have deployed
"a variety of policy instruments, including production subsidy,
export subsidy, investment-related measures such as export
obligation, domestic content requirements, technology transfer
clauses, risk-sharing insurance and export-fmancing schemes.6o
The neoclassical explanation for the so-called East Asian
Miracle proceeds from the premise that these countries adopted
rational, market-oriented policies by liberalizing imports,
adopting realistic exchange rates, and granting incentives for
exports.
In other words, industrial policy shaped an
environment in which prices in the international market
dictated its direction.
Lower capital/output ratios, the
elimination of inefficient "infant industries" and the challenge
to increase competitiveness in the global market provided the
impetus for higher growth and allowed for adjustments in the
"oil shock" debt crisis-ridden years of the 1970s.61

60. UNCTAD" SECRETARIAT, A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY RoUND AND THEIR EFFECTS ON THE TRADING PROSPECTS OF DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES, EXPANSION OF TRADING OPPORTUNITIES To THE YEAR 2000 FOR AsIAPACIFIC DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 102 n.3 (1995) [hereinafter UNCTAD REPORT].
61. The neoclassical accounts of the East Asian experience can be found in the
following works: BELA BALASSA, supra note 12; JAGDISH BHAGWATI, FOREIGN TRADE
REGIMES AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE ANATOMY AND CONSEQUENCES OF
EXCHANGE CONTROL REGIMES (1978); Gustav Ranis, EMPLOYMENT, INCOME
DISTRIBUTION AND GROWTH IN THE EAST AsIAN CONTEXT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS,
Paper Presented at the Conference on Experiences and Lessons of Small Open
Economies, Santiago, Chile (1981).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol5/iss1/6

32

Hizon: Virtual Reality and Reality

1999]

VIRTUAL REALITY AND REALITY

113

The exegesis of neoclassical economics has its share of critics.
The criticism points out the strong interventionist hand of the
state in promoting a "developmental state", which could not
justify the use of neoclassical analysis. In the view of the
critics, the NICs developed a strategy of "acquired dynamic
comparative advantage" rather than "endowed static
comparative advantage". Echoing the Japanese model, the
successful NICs directed capital, production and labor out of
declining sectors, and into more competitive ones, in response
to long-term opportunities in the international market.
Blessed with a very capable administrative apparatus ,62
measures were efficiently carried out, on the demand side by
restricting foreign competition, and on the supply side by
controlling factor prices.
In contrast, the United States underscores the removal of
impediments, such as overvalued exchange rates, export taxes,
and bureaucratic regulation, which it believes would
automatically increase exports.
Import liberalization
complements the reduction of export barriers because the
increase in access to cheaper inputs and foreign competition by
itself raises the level of competitiveness of manufactures. The
decline of America's hegemony;3 during the 1980s meant an
unwillingness to underwrite the maintenance of the liberal
trading order it created. Increasing U.S. trade deficits caused
by rising imports affecting domestic industries pointed to an
overall decline in the competitiveness of U.S. industry, even
threatening the critical high-technology sector, once thought to
be a traditional strength of the United States.
62. South Korea and Taiwan inherited from Japanese colonial rule an efficient
administrative bureaucracy, a well educated populated, modern infrastructure and a
good agricultural system
The decolonization process that occurred after their
independence included an extensive land reform program, which provided the
foundation for the sustained growth of agriculture and the capital needed to support
industrialization. See Yun-han Chu, The East Asian NICs: A State-Led Path to the
Developed World, in GLOBAL CHANGE, REGIONAL RESPONSE, supra note 42, at 199, 201202.
63. The overall decline in America's economic hegemony in the 1980s spawned
"declinist" literature, which associated a liberal economic order with the presence of a
hegemonic state such as Great Britain in the nineteenth century and the U.S. in the
postwar era See ROBERT GILPIN, WAR AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS (1981);
RoBERT GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1987); PAUL
KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS (1987).
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These problems were explained by market intervention by
foreign states. The promotion of key industries, which created
competitive advantage and skewed the international division of
labor, was deemed to be the culprit. Another factor was said to
be structural differences in national political-economic systems,
which gave firms in these countries an unfair competitive
advantage.64 In the view of these analysts, the U.S. was a
victim to strategic trade policies foisted by Japan, Europe and
the NICs of East Asia and Latin America.65 Of course, it was
not as significant to the United States that, through its defense
and research programs, subsidies were· provided to the
computer, semiconductor, nuclear power, aerospace and
pharmaceutical industries - all of which led, naturally, to a
technological edge in these areas. 66 But in the late 1980s,
industrial sectors that were once world leaders - such as steel,
semiconductors, automobiles and microelectronics - came
under intense competition,67 and reflected the accelerating
decline of America's economic and strategic place in the world
economy.68
.
In the classic, updated edition of the most influential and
widely read analysis of the U.S. trade-policy-making system,
I.M. Destler describes the mood in the 1980s:
In this atmosphere of broad trade frustration,
many became deeply skeptical about the liberal

64. An entire book industry sprouted to point the fmger at Japan and the East
Asian NICs as the cause for the disequilibrium in the trading system. Among the
notable "Japan-bashing" tomes is CLYDE PRESTOWITZ, JR., TRADING PLACES: How WE
ALLOWED JAPAN TO TAKE THE LEAD (1988). The main object of attack was Japan's
keiretsu system (i.e., formal and informal links among enterprises and banks within
large industrial groupings which allow for lower credit, exclusive market distribution,
and discrimination against imports) and emulations thereof in the NICs (e.g. the
chaebol in South Korea).
65. TALKING TRADE, U.S. POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 7-8 (Robert S.
Walters ed., 1993) !hereinafter TALKING TRADEJ. The literature on strategic trade
policy includes AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION: GoVERNMENT
POLICIES AND CORPORATE STRATEGIES (John Zysman & Laura Tyson eds., 1983);
STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (Paul Krugman
ed., 1986); THE POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY (Claude Barfield & William Schambra
eds., American Enterprise Institute 1986).
66. TALKING TRADE, supra note 65, at II.
67. I.M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS 48 (1995).
68. See PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS (1987).
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image of a world growing more and more open,
governed increasingly by common rules of
nondiscrimination in trade. What they came to
see was an "unfair" world where other nations
played loose with the rules and "nice guys" were
likely to finish last. They were willing to
compete, but they demanded a "level playing
field," not one tilted against the United States. 69
It was flo surprise that in the 1980s, many in the United States

believed that the GATT was not effective. With the growing
importance of international investment and services, and the
decreasing competitiveness in goods, the GATT, which covered
only trade in goods, was become increasingly irrelevant.7o
Thus, U.S. trade policy began to stress more exacting levels of
protection (or, conversely, degrees of market access), and was
not satisfied with mere reciprocal changes in protection. 71 The
focus of trade strategy thus shifted to a sector- and resultsoriented policy, from one that stressed the process of
liberalization. 72 It becomes painfully clear, contrary to any
assertion by any party of its benevolence in favoring any free
trade order, that the liberal trading system was useful only
insofar as it could satisfy national trade interests.
The same can be said of the European Union's trade policy.
The EU's deepening integration and subsequent expansion to
include twelve, and then fifteen members, has made the
regional economic grouping a stronger player, and potentially
the strongest participant in international trade. To a large
extent, the formulation of rules for the internal market, by
themselves, represent the most significant trade policy strategy
in relation to the rest of the world. To date, the question of the
consistency of the EUs single market with Article XXIV of the
GATT Agreement and with the general principle of non-

DESTLER, supra note 67, at 9 (emphasis added).
THOMAS O. BAYARD & KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTI', RECIPROCITY AND RETALIATION
IN U.S. TRADE POLICY 10-11 (Institute for International Economics 1994).
69.
70.

71.

See William R. Cline, Reciprocity: A New Approach to World Trade Policy? 7

POLICY ANALYSES IN INT'L ECON 2, 7 (1982).
72. BAYARD & ELLIOTI', supra note 70, at 11.
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discrimination, has never been satisfactorily resolved. 73
Furthermore, the EUs preferential bilateral accords with the
new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, the
Mediterranean states, and Mrican, Caribbean and Pacific
(ACP) former colonies under the Lome Convention - forming a
perplexing potpourri of arrangements
raise further
questions regarding their compatibility with the GATT. The
evolution to the WTO has yet to settle these contradictions.
Although the formation of the EU's single market was guided
by a liberal economic vision committed to the reduction of
internal and external barriers, protectionism comes to the fore
through its "complex and multi-layered process of trade policy
formulation and implementation."74 The liberal philosophy of
the European integration process clashes with the mercantilist
forces unleashed at the lower administrative echelons. Often,
European officials at the bureaucratic levels can be influenced
by industries with whom they interact. This seeming disparity
in theory and practice has been defined as a paradox of
liberalism confmed by pragmatism. 75 With the European
Commission striving to pull trade and policy away from the EU
member states, it needs to appear to be sympathetic to
domestic industrial interests.76
Like the United States, the European Community in the early
1980s entered into discriminatory bilateral and sectoral
arrangements with countries outside the circle of former
European colonies with which it had preferential agreements.77
But in the latter part of the 1980s and well into the 1990s, the
Commission preferred to use more legalistic and sophisticated
trade instruments.
Accordingly, it engaged in vigorous

73. See Jagdish Bhagwati, Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview, in NEW
DIMENSIONS IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION 22-50 (Jaime de Melo & Arvind Panagariya
eds., 1993).
74. Lars Anell, Concluding Remarks by Chairman of the GATT Council, April 1516, 1991,2 GAT!' TRADE POllCY REVIEW 3 (1991).
75. Thomas R. Howell, Rosemary E. Gwynn & R. Michael Gadbaw, European
Community, in CONFLICT AMONG NATIONS, TRADE POLICIES IN THE 1990s 389-468
(1992) [hereinafter CONFLICT AMONG NATIONS).
76.
Id. at 397.
77. Gardner Paterson, The European Community as a Threat to the System, in
TRADE POLICY IN THE 1980s 230-231 (William R. Cline ed., 1983).
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application of anti-dumping laws, rules of origin, and the New
Commercial Policy Instrument, which was patterned after the
Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974.78 But while the U.S.
resorted to "aggressive unilateralism" to punish what it
considered to be "unfair" trade practices, the EU responded to
trade pressures via its industrial policy within the common
market, notably through the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP), export monitoring of competitive foreign suppliers,
government rationalization schemes, and massive regional and
research subsidies. Moreover, all the EU's major temperatezone agricultural commodities, except oilseeds, are isolated
from external competition through the Community's variable
import levies. In most sensitive sectors, tariffs have given way
to anti-dumping, the most frequently used trade instrument.19

v.

THE CONCEPT OF "FAIR": WHEN FAIR IS UNFAIR

The question inevitably arises as to what constitutes "unfair
trade" among states. It is a fiction to claim that the
GATTIWTO regime is not an institutional mechanism to
enforce a exclusive set of economic beliefs and values.
Although the trend towards "liberalization" has achieved a
broad consensus, as the Uruguay Round attests, there are
numerous fundamental contentious matters that have yet to be
resolved.
First and foremost: What is "unfair"? Is a measure unfair if it
is not consistent with the GATT, or when it does not conform to
certain institutional structures and economic practices? And if
the GATT rules are changed, as they have been to a certain
extent in the WTO Agreements, do previously "fair" practices
become "unfair", or vice-versa? Is there a single defmitive,

78. See Ivo VAN BAEL & JEAN-FRANCOIS BELLIS, ANTIDUMPING AND OTHER TRADE
PROTECTION LAws OF THE EEC (1990); RULES OF ORIGIN IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY (Edwin Vermulst, Paul Waer, & Jacques Bourgeois eds., 1994)
[hereinafter RULES OF ORIGIN IN INTERNATIONAL TRADEJ. Professor Meessen retorts
that Europe's arsenal of trade measures is not impressive. Karl M. Meessen, Europe en
Route to 1992: The Completion of the Internal Market and Its Impact on NonEuropeans, 23 INT'L LAw. 359 (Summer 1989).
79. See 1 GATT TRADE POL'Y REv. 2-6 (1993).
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appropriate role for the state in a country's economic
development? If the managed market intervention on the part
of the East Asian NICs, purportedly contrary to liberal trade
principles, is unfair, then punitive unilateral measures that
determine whether another state's trade practices, agricultural
subsidies, or overzealous anti-dumping and countervailing duty
determinations are equally, if not more, unfair. Even the
threat of imposing such measures, although technically
permissible as long as they are not yet in effect, does not
constitute "fair" trade in view of the asymmetrical economic
relationships in the trading system. It is about time that even
the determination of "fairness" be fair.
Many newly industrializing countries (e.g. Taiwan, Korea and
Brazil) which previously fostered an industrial policy to
promote their domestic industries, have embraced many of the
GATTIWTO regulatory mechanisms of their own volition. This
movement away from restrictive border measures sprung from
a realization that such measures, in the long term, insulate
domestic industries from foreign competitive pressures and
may prevent them from maintaining their international
competitive edge. It is clear, however, that these countries
would not have reached this stage, if the NICs had not pursued
the carefully managed, rational market interventions that
purportedly violated the GATT value system. The GATT's
Holy Grail is a market where government interference is
restrained. But can Paradise be found on GATTIWTO earth?
American attorneys who have frequently represented local
parties against Japanese and other foreign firms in 301 cases,
as well as others who believe that the U.S. should not give up
its ability to react unilaterally, admit that because there is
really no "international consensus as to what constitutes
acceptable behavior in the pursuit of national interests, the
GATT cannot be said currently to represent a mechanism for
enforcing a comprehensive set of shared economic and
industrial policy values. Absent mutual consensus on the
values and rules which are being enforced, the elaboration and
strengthening of GATT dispute resolution mechanisms cannot
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succeed in mediating fundamental conflicts arising out of the
pursuit of national commercial advantage.'180
VI.

THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM

The 1994 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) contained in the Uruguay
Round agreements81 stands as the centerpiece of the WTO
system. The DSU "judicializes'182 what once was a dispute
settlement procedure based on compromise.
The former
"contracting parties" of the GATT are now "members" of the
WTO.
The main organ of the WTO is the ministerial
conference, which meets every two years. The body of members
form the WTO Council, which is in turn divided into three
councils: the Council for Trade in Goods, the Council for Trade
in Services, and the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights. When the WTO Council meets en
toto to discuss a case under the dispute settlement procedure,
the Council acts as the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). The
DSU serves as the main vehicle to enforce the rights and
obligations under all the "covered agreements.'183
These

80. Thomas R. Howell & Alan Wm. Wolff, Introduction, in CONFLICT AMONG
NATIONS, supra note 75, at 15.
81. The agreements negotiated in the Uruguay Round are attached as Annexes to
the main Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization. See Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO AGREEMENTl, Apr. 15,
1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations [hereinafter URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTSl. Annex 1 includes the WTO
AGREEMENT, together with a number of covered agreements. Annex 2 contains the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
[hereinafter DSU]. Annex 3 contains the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, and Annex
4 includes four plurilateral trade agreements (covering civil aircraft, government
procurement, dairy and bovine meat products) which are not automatically covered by
the dispute settlement procedure.
Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, Art. XIV in Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.
82. Pieter-Jan Kuyper, The New WTO Dispute Settlement System .. the Impact on

the Community.
83. The "covered agreements" under the WTO umbrella are enumerated in Annex
1, to wit: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994; Understanding on the
Interpretation of Article II:I(b) of GATT 1994; Understanding on the Interpretation of
Article XVII of the GATT 1994; Understanding on Balance-of-Payments Provisions of
GATT 1994; Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994;
Understanding in Respect of Waivers of Obligations under GATT 1994; Understanding
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"covered agreements" compnse the multilateral trade
agreements that bind all WTO members. With respect to the
plurilateral trade agreements, which do not bind all WTO
members, each them contains provisions according to which
disputes arising thereunder may be settled in accordance with
the DSU. 84
The dispute settlement process of the WTO explicitly aspires to
provide security and predictability to the multilateral trading
system. It does so by preserving the rights and obligations of
its members under the covered substantive agreements, and by
clarifying the existing provisions of those agreements in
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public
internationallaw,85 within a set of deadlines and in conformity
with a prescribed procedure. The DSB, acting as a plenary
organ, has the power to make decisions by "negative
consensus", whereby a matter submitted for consideration is
deemed decided if no member, present at the meeting of the
DSB when the decision is taken, formally objects to the
proposed decision.86 These decisions can be interposed before
the adoption of a panel, after the adoption of a panel report or
appellate body ruling, and concurrently with the authorization
of countermeasures by suspension of concessions or obligations.
From all indications, the WTO dispute procedure has attracted
the interest of more member states, whereas the previous
GATT dispute settlement procedures attracted only lukewarm
reception.
As of January 14, 1999, 157 requests for
consultation have been presented to the WTO, which number

on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994; Marrakesh Protocol to GATT
1994; Agreement on Agriculture; Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures; Agreement on Textiles and Clothing; Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade; Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs);
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994, the Customs Valuation
Agreement; Agreement on Preshipment Inspection; Agreement on Rules of Origin;
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures; Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures; Agreement on Safeguards; General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS) and its Annexes; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property (TRIPS). See WTO AGREEMENT, supra note 81.
84. DSU, supra note 81, art. 2:1.
85. DSU, supra note 81, art. 3:2.
86. DSU, supra note 81, art. 2:4.
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already exceeds half the number of cases filed during the entire
life of the GATT, from 1948 to 1994. One hundred twenty of
the cases presented to the WTO have materialized into distinct
matters that may lead to panel reports. Eighty-eight of these
matters were filed by developed country members, and twentynine by developing country members; four matters were filed
jointly by developed and developing country members. Of
these matters, 18 cases are completed, while 30 were either
settled or are inactive. 87 In its newsletter (WTO Focus), the
WTO Secretariat has assessed the performance of the WTO
dispute settlement record in comparison to that of the earlier
GATT system as follows:
about one quarter of the disputes are resolved
by the parties themselves at the initial
consultation stage;
members are actively using the appeals
procedure, with all panel reports issued so far
being brought to the Appellate Body for a final
ruling;
the improved mechanism has enabled adoption
by the DSB of all the Appellate Body reports
and panel reports as modified by them that
have so far been issued, unlike under the old
GATT, when adoption took time and a number
of panel reports were never adopted at all;
developing countries have become active users
of the procedures. 88
Under the former GATT dispute settlement scheme, the "three
Cs" - conciliation, consensus and compromise - formed the
core of conflict-resolution.
Trade conflicts were resolved

87. World Trade Organization, Overview of the State-or-play of WTO Disputes,
WTO
BULLETIN
1,
27-28
(Jan.
14,
1999)
<http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/bulletin.htm>.
88. WTO Focus 21 (1997).
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through negotiation rather than litigation.89 Article XXII of
GATT 1947 merely provided that each contracting party should
accord "sympathetic consideration" to, and afford adequate
opportunity for consultation regarding, the representations of
another party.90 Article XXIII of GATT 1947 provides the legal
foundation for the 1979 Tokyo Round Understanding,91 which
formalized the panel proceeding created by request of the
complaining party. The panel proceeding paved the way for a
more adversarial type of conflict-resolution among GATT
parties. 92 If the panel's recommendation was not followed and
no satisfactory adjustment was made by the party concerned,
the GATT Contracting Parties (acting asa whole) could
authorize an individual contracting party to retaliate by
suspending concessions or obligations, as appropriate.93 Since
the Contracting Parties' decision to allow countermeasures had
to be unanimous, the ''losing'' party under a panel
recommendation could block implementation of the report
sip1ply by vetoing it. 94 The new WTO dispute settlement rules
preclude this result.

89. See the lucid comparison of the old and new modes of dispute settlement in
Edwin Vermulst & Bart Driessen, An Overview of the WTO Dispute Settlement System
and its Relationship with the Uruguay Round Agreements, 29 J. WORLD TRADE L. 2,
134 (1995).
90. GATT 1947, art. XXII:1.
91. Understanding on Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement, and
Surveillance of 28 November 1979, BISD 26S/210 (1980) [hereinafter 1979
UNDERSTANDING].
92. [d., arts. 10-21.
93. GATT 1947, art. XXIII:2.
94. Paragraph 4 of the Agreed Description of the Customary Practice of the GATT
in the Field of Dispute Settlement (Article XXIII:2) annexed to the 1979
UNDERSTANDING, supra note 91, provides:
Before bringing a case, contracting parties have exercised their
judgment as to whether action under Article XXIII:2 would be
fruitful. Those cases which have come before the CONTRACTING
PARTIES under this provision have, with few exceptions, been
brought to a satisfactory conclusion. The aim of the CONTRACTING
PARTIES has always been to secure a positive solution to a dispute.
A solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute is clearly to
be preferred. In the absence of a mutually agreed solution, the first
objective of the CONTRACTING PARTIES is usually to secure the
withdrawal of the measures concerned if these are found to be
inconsistent with the General Agreement.
The provision of
compensation should be resorted to only if the immediate withdrawal
of the measure is impracticable and as a temporary measure pending
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Under the DSU, the dispute settlement template acquires a
more litigious pattern. As under GATT 1947, the WTO process
begins with a request for consultation. If the matter is not
resolved in this manner, the member concerned may request a
panel, unless the DSB decrees otherwise. Once the parties
agree on the panelists, the panel is formed, which issues a
report to be considered for adoption by the DSB within 60 days.
If a negative consensus emerges, appeals of issues of law
covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed
by the panel may be made to the new Appellate Body of seven
members. The DSB must adopt the Appellate Body report, and
the parties must consent to it unconditionally, within 30 days,
unless a consensus to reject it exists. The existence of an
Appellate Body signifies a recourse for members who are not
satisfied with the panel's ruling, giving a more "adjudicative
flavor" to the panel procedure. 95
It is not the purpose of this section to analyze the minutiae of

the dispute settlement procedure in the WTO. However, a few
elements within this paradigm have particular relevance to
developing countries in general, and the circumstances of East
Asian NICs in particular. Article 3:12 of the DSU makes an
express reference to complaints brought by a developing
country member against a developed country member. In lieu
of the DSU provisions on consultations, conciliation and
mediation, and panels, a developing country member has the
right to invoke the Decision of 5 April 1996 on Procedures
under Article XXIII of GATT 1947.96 Under this Decision,
developing country complainants have the option to avail of the
good offices of the Director-General, acting in an ex officio
capacity, to facilitate a solution by consulting the parties
concerned, and with other contracting parties or inter-

95.
96.

the withdrawal of the measures which are inconsistent with the
General Agreement. The last resort which Article XXIII provides to
the country invoking this procedure is the possibility of suspending
the application of concessions or other obligations on a discriminatory
basis vis-it-vis the other contracting party, subject to authorization by
the CONTRACTING PARTIES of such measures. Such action has
only rarely been contemplated and cases taken under Article XXIII:2
have led to such action in only one case.
Vermulst & Driessen, supra note 89, at 144.
Decision of April 5, 1996 on Procedures under Article XXIII, BISD 148/18.
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governmental organizations to promote a mutually acceptable
solution. 97
In theory, the new adjudicatory procedures and safeguards
built into the DSU regime underscore the importance of the
rule of law in the organization of world trade. The Uruguay
Round multilateral agreements added more detail and
precision to the provisions of GATT 1947 and the Tokyo Round
agreements. 98 The DSU seeks to ensure compliance with
decisions of the panel and the Appellate Body by bestowing
upon panel reports and decisions resolved by the Appellate
Body the quality of judicial formality and finality. In the
August 1997 issue of its WTO Focus newsletter, the WTO
Secretariat announced that it had received its 100th request
for trade dispute resolution, in just a little more than two-anda-half years of existence. The average of 40 disputes a year
represents a vote of confidence by WTO members in the new
dispute settlement mechanism. The GATT dealt with 300
disputes in its lifetime, or roughly six disputes a year.
Developing countries have also become active users of the
procedures, filing 31 of these cases (29 of which materialized
into distinct matters). In some instances, developing countries
have filed cases against other developing countries, a rare
phenomenon during the GATT era.99 Seventeen Appellate
Body reports had been adopted as of January 1999.100
A European scholar has expressed the widely shared view that
the enlargement of the scope of the dispute settlement
provisions reduces the possibility for unilateral action by
certain states, such as the U.S.'s Section 301 and the EU's new
Trade Barriers Regulation (TBR) (which replaced the 1984
New Policy Instrument).101 A couple of years ago, the United
97. Id., arts. 1 & 3.
98. Paul Demaret, The Metamorphoses of the GAT!': From the Havana Charter to
the World Trade Organization 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 123, 135-136 (1995).
99. Disputes Reach Century Mark, 21 WTO FOCUS 1 (1997).
100. World
Trade
Organization
Website,
Dispute
Settlement,
<http://www.wto.org>.
101. Demaret, supra note 98, at 136.· The new Trade Barriers Regulation (TBR),
Council Regulation 3286/94 specifies internal procedures for actions against
objectionable or illicit trade practices abroad, including certain areas of services and
intellectual property. The actions must be authorized under international dispute
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States served notice of its displeasure at its small share of the
South Korean auto market by designating South Korea a
"priority foreign country" (as of October 1, 1997) in the
automobile sector under "Super 301" of the 1988 Trade Act,
which still operates by executive order of the U.S. President.
This procedure allows the U.S. to impose economic sanctions if,
during the eighteen-month period following the designation,
the United States is not satisfied with South Korea's efforts to
remove trade barriers. South Korea, for its part, intends to
take the dispute to the WTO, if the U.S. unilaterally imposes
any measures pursuant to Super 301. This would be the acid
test that would challenge the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism and lay bare the inherent contradictions between
the "rule of law" it seeks to perpetuate, and the "rule of might"
wielded by economically powerful countries. 102
True enough, the WTO reports that developing countries are
becoming active users of the multilateral dispute-settlement
mechanism, in contrast to their lukewarm reaction thereto
under the GATT. Developed countries filed the vast majority of
GATT dispute-settlement cases. No doubt, the near-automatic
establishment of panels and adoption of their reports, and the
strict timetables for every phase of the panel process contribute

settlement provisions. The TBR, which replaces the 1984 New Commercial Policy
Instrument (Council Regulation 2641184), was patterned after the 301 provisions of the
U.S. Omnibus Trade Act, but is, in contrast, a law without teeth. The European
Commission sees the purpose of the regulation as to achieve greater trade
liberalization within the context of international rules, rather than to protect the
domestic market. European industries may complain about obstacles to trade having
an effect on the EU market, but may also complain about obstacles having an effect on
third-country markets resulting in adverse trade effects to EU industries. See a brief
description of the TBR in WTO, 1 TRADE POLICY REVIEW, EUROPEAN UNION 65-67
(1995).
102. Choi Byung II, "Who's Afraid of Super 30l?" in The Fifth Column, FAR E.
ECON. REV. 37 (1997). To a certain extent, the facts show that America has a point.
Only 10,000 American cars were sold to Korea, whereas 200,000 were imported by the
U.S. from Korea. Washington demands that Korea reduce its import tariff on
passenger cars from 8% to the U.S. level of 2.5%. The U.S. is also asking Korea to
change its method of taxing cars based on engine size. The Korean auto manufacturers
object to the methods used to increase U.S. market share.
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to the greater reliance on the WTO's dispute settlement
procedures .103
Repercussions from a state's non-compliance with an adverse
ruling remain a remote possibility, as long as one of the parties
to the dispute does not possess enough economic or political
might to resist the decision or to retaliate in another sector
that could cause greater harm to the favored party. In the
WTO framework, as in the previous GATT system, the design .
of the legal structure needs to be complemented by the
willingness of any party, including the more economically
powerful states, to conform to the results of the DSU rulings
regardless of the outcome. In 1995, world merchandise trade of
the four leading exporters and importers - the European
Union, the United States, Japan and Canada - still covers
more than half of the world's trade. (The figure is even higher
if intra-EU trade is included. 104) Thus, the full cooperation of
these countries is of crucial importance.
Without their
acquiescence, the purity of the system is violated, and its
effectiveness fatally impaired.
The more ominous threat comes from the use (or threatened
use) of unilateral measures, when brandished about side by
side with exhortations to follow the formal procedures in the
WTO system. The fears over the "Super 301" clause arose
because at the time when it was unveiled, the GATT dispute
settlement procedure was then in place, and was perceived to
be an unsatisfactory alternative to the swifter action that could
be brought about by Super 301. With an effective multilateral
dispute resolution mechanism now in place, the rationale for
"Super 301" or any similar option disappears. Its lingering
existence discloses the still festering "power-based" regime
cohabiting with the WTO global trading order. Bilateral
negotiations outside the WTO framework undermines the
WTO's fundamental design.

103. 9 WTO Focus 1-2 (1996). Among the latest panels reflecting this new trend is
the one requested by the Philippines to examine its complaint against Brazil regarding
Brazil's imposition of countervailing duties on desiccated coconut from the Philippines.
The fIrst WTO dispute, which was settled bilaterally, involved Singapore and Malaysia.
104. 10 WTO Focus 7 (1996).
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VII. THE "SINGLE UNDERTAKING" AND THE PROBLEM
OF LINKAGE
Under the Uruguay Round agreements, the concept of the
"single undertaking" has been introduced. In contrast to the
fragmented nature of the Tokyo Round codes and the
authorized exclusions to the main GATT agreement, the
commitments under the WTO Agreement encompass all fifteen
negotiating areas. Accordingly, members (as well as interested
would-be members) were compelled to accept the composite
single legal instrument: the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization. 105
The "single undertaking" approach is a double-edged sword.
On the one hand, the definitive singularity of the package of
commitments appears to guarantee that the members will
conform to the dispute settlement procedure. Failure to
observe commitments in one sector allows retaliation in
another. This concept permits "total bargaining" across issue
areas, linking one issue with another, such as trade and
intellectual property rights. It is argued that such form of legal
consistency will be able to cut across the different institutional
regimes, injecting predictability into the rules and procedures
behind governmental actions. 106 Moreover, a single package of
commitments reduces the risk of "free-riding" and forces all the
member states to comply (except for the four plurilateral
agreements) with the same obligations.107
However, this license to retaliate, not only threatens to disturb
the equilibrium of an international regime, but can effectively
sanction reversion to a "power" rather than "rule-based"

105. WTO AGREEMENT, supra note 81, art. XIV.
106. Roessler, supra note 29, at 47.
107. In addition to the WTO AGREEMENT, there are four multilateral trade

agreements, and four plurilateral trade agreements. The four multilateral agreements
are the following: Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods; the General Agreement
on Trade in Services; the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS); and the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (DSU).
The four plurilateral agreements are: the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft; the
Agreement on Government Procurement; the International Dairy Agreement; and the
International Bovine Meat Agreement.
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structure within the WTO framework. While its aim to ensure
the implementation of the dispute settlement is noble in
theory, cross-retaliation can only be the weapon of the ~trong
against the weak. A situation where a relatively weaker state·
loses a case and faces the threat of retaliation if it does not
comply with an adverse panel or Appellate Body decision would
not pose any problem, unlike a scenario where a ruling is
rendered against a more economically powerful party. In the
former case, retaliation - even if legally available - would be
ineffectual.
It IS true that the WTO's dispute settlement procedure has
procedural constraints intended to prevent possible abuse of
the option of cross-retaliation. The chief restriction is that the
complaining party should first seek to suspend concessions or
obligations with respect to the same sector concerned, before
suspending concessions or obligations with respect to other
sectors in the agreement. lOB However, the complaining party
itself determines whether the suspension of concessions in the
same sector is impracticable or ineffective, and whether the
circumstances are indeed serious enough. 109 Placing such a
determination in the hands of the complaining party affords
wide latitude for abuse. The complaining party has the
discretion to opt for retaliation in another sector, when in its
own judgment, the suspension of obligations in the same sector,
which could be availed of when the recommendations or rulings
are not implemented within a reasonable amount of time,no is

not effective.
The DSU provides for additional safeguards to counter the
potential severity of cross-retaliation. Before pushing forward,
the party should request authorization from the DSB for the
suspension of concessions.11l As a general rule, the DSB grants
authorization to suspend the concession or obligation within
thirty days of the expiry of the reasonable period of time,
unless it decides, by negative consensus, to reject the request.

108. DSU, supra note 81, art. 22:3.
109. [d., art. 22:3 (b) & (c).
110. [d., art. 22:1.
111. [d., art. 22:2.
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If the affected member objects to the level of suspension
proposed, there is a final recourse in the form of arbitration,
which may either be carried out by the original panel if
available, or by an arbitrator appointed by the DirectorGeneral. 112

However, the scope of the arbitrator's authority is fairly
circumscribed. The arbitrator cannot examine the nature of
the concessions or other obligations to be suspended, but can
merely determine whether the level of such suspension is
equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment of rights
under the agreement. The arbitrator's evaluation is limited to
the magnitude of the withdrawal of concessions, and not to the
issue of cross-retaliation itself. As stated by one former GATT
Senior Legal Officer, "[t]he objective is not to re-balance
obligations, but [to] achieve compliance with the rules.,,1l3 As
the rules allow retaliation across sectors, the chances of
preventing the same are minimal, provided that there has been
compliance with the procedural conditions.
As a final resort, the DSU provides that if the matter referred
for arbitration involves a claim regarding the rule that the
complaining party first seek to suspend concessions in the
same sector before opting to seek cross-retaliation, the
arbitrator can determine whether or not such procedure has
been followed. 114 This precautionary measure is equally
constricted in its scope: It appears to confme itself to
determining whether the proper sequence of options was
complied with by the complaining party, rather than
investigating an abuse of the discretion exercised by the
complaining party. In the end, the complaining party retains
the choice to retaliate in another sector, if it deems it
impracticable or ineffective to do otherwise.

Cross-retaliation is undeniably a potent tool. It is therefore is
a vital component of the DSB's enforcement mandate. Cross-

112. [d., art. 22:6.
113. Amelia Porges, The New Dispute Settlement: From the GATT to the WTO, 8
LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 115, 133 (1995).
114. DSU, supra note 81, art. 22:7.
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retaliation may be permitted, for instance, in the area of
textiles or agriculture (which many developing countries
export) for nullification of obligations in the field of financial
services or intellectual property (where developed economies
hold sway). While it forges "cohesion" in the WTO system,l15 it
can also promote abuse in the hands of a powerful state, since
the same "check and balance" design for ordinary retaliation
applies to this extraordinary measure.
Similarly, crossretaliation is ineffective if the weaker country that wishes to
wield it, cannot use it against a stronger member.
In order to ensure that the United States would accept the
Uruguay Round agreements, then-USTR Mickey Kantor
promised the Republican Congress that the Democratic
administration would support legislation to establish a WTO
Dispute Settlement Review Commission. This Commission
would consist of five federal appellate judges, appointed by the
President, who would review all fmal WTO dispute settlement
reports adverse to the United States, to determine whether the
panel exceeded its authority or acted outside the scope of the
Agreement. Three out of five votes would be sufficient for an
affirmative determination.
Following the issuance of an affirmative determination by this
Commission, any member of the U.S. Congress would be able to
introduce a Joint Resolution calling on the President to
negotiate new dispute settlement rules that would address and
correct the problem identified by the Commission.
Furthermore, if the Commission issues three affirmative
determinations in any five-year period, any member of
Congress could introduce a Joint Resolution to disapprove U.S.
participation in the WTO. If such Resolution is enacted by
Congress and signed by the President, the U.S. would
commence withdrawal from the WTO Agreement. 116

115. Porges, supra note 113, at 124.
116. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Documents Relating to the

Agreement Between the Clinton Administration and Sen. Robert Dole Concerning the
Uruguay Round Agreements, DAILY EXEC. REP. 225 (Nov. 25, 1994); Documents
Relating to the Clinton Administration's Agreement with Sen. Robert Dole Concerning
the Uruguay Round Agreement, 11 INT'L TRADE REP. 1865 (1994).
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Largely because of these reassurances, the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act1l7 was signed into law on December 8, 1994.
Both the Uruguay Round Agreements Act and the proposed
Dispute Settlement Review Commission were designed to
alleviate fears that these agreements would encroach on U.S.
sovereignty. us The Uruguay Round Agreements Act decrees
that any provision in the Uruguay Round agreements that is
inconsistent with U.S. legislation that defines rights and
obligations on a domestic level shall have no effect. U.S. laws
cannot be changed by WTO decisions. u9 The Uruguay Round
agreements, like the GATT, have no direct effect in the United
States. 120
The Uruguay Round Agreements Act clearly does not alter U.S.
obligations at the international level. Yet the possible use of
unilateral Section 301 sanctions - which fall within the scope
of domestic U.S. law but are based on issues covered by the
Uruguay Round agreements - would obviously violate the
dispute settlement provisions of the WTO,l21 which provide the
exclusive procedure for resolving trade disputes. The exclusion
of all other modes of redress guarantees the transparency,
predictability and security of the WTO process.122 In view of
the unequivocal intent of the DSU, any argument that concedes

117. 19 U.S.C. §3501 (1994).
118. William J. Aceves, Lost Sovereignty? The Implications of the Uruguay Round
Agreements, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 427,457 (1995).
119. Id. at 457,468.
120. See Thomas William France, The Domestic Legal Status of the GATT: The
Need for Clarification, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1481 (1994); Ronald Brand, The Status
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in the United States Domestic Law, 26
STAN. J. INT'L L. 479 (1990); John Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade in United States Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REV. 250,312 (1967).
121. Section 301 has a broad scope. It was established by the U.S. Congress to
protect the United States from "unfair trade practices." Section 301(a) authorizes
retaliation against a foreign state if the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) determines
that the rights of the U.S. under any trade agreement are denied or violated, or if an
act of a foreign government is inconsistent with or denies benefits to the U.S. under
such trade agreement, or if such action is unjustifiable and burdens U.S. commerce.
Section 301(b) authorizes the USTR to take discretionary action if a foreign
government practice is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S.
Commerce. Retaliation, which is subject to the specific direction of the President, can
include the suspension or withdrawal of benefits of trade agreements as well as duties
or other import restrictions. Trade Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. §2420.
122. Andreas Lowenfeld, Remedies Along With Rights: Institutional Reform in the
New GATT, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 477, 486 (1994).
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the need for a "constructive" or "benevolent" unilateralism
must necessarily be discarded. 123 Many, however, still endorse
the contradictory view that unilateralism spurred the
conclusion of the Uruguay Round, and continues to enhance
the multilateral process in the global trade regime. 124
It is clear to the U.S. legislature that the WTO will not have the

fmal decision on the rules, and that when the rules do not lead
to a favorable outcome, the United States will negotiate for a
change in the rules. Thus, even when the rationale of the
enlarged WTO procedures is to ensure that all members
conform with the rules, when such rules do not satisfy
American interests (as represented by the Congress), the U.S.
will work for their modification. The bottom line is that the
United States, under present legislation, may take any
unilateral action it deems appropriate, regardless of its
obligations under the provisions of the Uruguay Round
agreements. As one commentator put it, the U.S. "maintains
sovereign authority to determine and regulate its behavior at
both the domestic and internationallevels."125 While the DSU
may sap the United States' resolve in utilizing its 301
sanctions, or put differently, raise the bar for its use, the
availability of the option remains.
As long as one of the four major players in the world economy
can wield the stick in total disregard of the dispute settlement
process, the fragile balance of the adjudication process is
always in jeopardy. The DSU establishes an effective sanction
system on a multilateral level. As long as no unilateral action
by any party is taken, no DSUIWTO rule is violated. However,
the sword of Damocles that hangs over the head of the DSB

123. See, e.g., Alan Sykes, Constructive Unilateral Threats in International
Commercial Relations: The Limited Case for Section 301, 23 L. & POL'y. INT'L Bus. 263
(1991); Alan Sykes, Mandatory Retaliation for Breach of Trade Agreements: Some
Thoughts on the Strategic Design of Section 301, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J. 301 (1990); James R.
Arnold, The Oilseeds Dispute and the Validity of Unilateralism in a Multilateral
Context, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 187 (1994); Robert Hudec, Thinking About the New
Section 301: Beyond Good and Evil, in AGGRESSNE UNlLATERALISM (Jagdish Bhagwati
& Hugh Patrick eds., 1990).
124. See Judith Hippler Bello, Claire E. Reade, Janet A. Nuzum & G. Hamilton
Loeb, International Trade Highlights in 1995, 30 INT'L LAw. 391 (1996).
125. Aceves, supra note 118, at 469.
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cheapens the process, and bears a constant reminder of its
mortality in the face of a powerful nation. In a sense, this piece
of U.S. legislative sorcery in regard to dispute settlement is a
microcosm of the entire evolution of GATT behavior
modification to suit the interests of the major players in
international trade.
VIII. THE SITUATIONAL CONTEXT OF THE DSU
Although the new dispute settlement procedure in the WTO
Agreement "judicializes" the entire process of conflict
resolution, and pursues a fair equilibrium of rights among
member states, the situational context of the new rules should
be examined for a balanced perspective. The shift in 1994 from
the GATT 1947 Agreement to the WTO represents a quantum
leap in terms of the scope of coverage. What was once an
agreement more or less restricted to trade in goods, has now
expanded to one which eliminates barriers in the growing trade
in services, intellectual property and investments, where the
richer countries have an undeniably overwhelming intrinsic
advantage over the less affiuent participating countries. As the
developed nations' economies shifted from manufacturing
towards their comparative advantage in services, GATT's
gravitational center steadily migrated towards greater
emphasis on trade in services, wider coverage in the realm of
intellectual property, and to a lesser extent, concern with
trade-related investment measures.
To a large extent, the trade issues involved with services and
intellectual property are intimately linked to the goods
exported by the developed nations. The growth in services,
mainly in the business service sector, is often necessary to
obtain productivity gains in goods-producing industries. The
bulk of international trade in services occurs in the form of
services embodied in goods, for example, computer
programming stored in a diskette as software or ISDN digital
technology in telecommunications equipment. These services
are built' into goods that are primarily subject to the usual
tariffs and trade barriers for goods. Thus, in many cases, the
export of higher-technology services are no different from the
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export of goods arising from such services.126 Since the
developed economies were victim to trade deficits with Japan
and the NICs due to the disparity in their export volumes in
manufactures, payment of these goods would no longer have
been possible unless income from service, or embodied service
exports could be generated. It was, therefore, inevitable that
services and intellectual property would become an important
concern in the Uruguay Round negotiations.
From this standpoint alone, changes in the relative competitive
positions of the triangular relationship among LDC, NIC and
the major economic powers, determined the peculiar balance or to be more precise the imbalance - of rights and obligations
in the Uruguay Round agreements. This not too subtle policy
drift was not surprising, considering that among the developed
country markets, the Quad countries - the European Union,
the United States, Canada and Japan - account for more than
ninety percent of developed country exports.
In contrast, the developing countries' share in world
merchandise (excluding fuels) showed an increase from 14.4 to
19.2 percent between 1980 and 1992, while their percentage of
the world's export of services declined from 20.8 to 18 percent
between 1985 and 1992. The developing countries' increasing
share of world merchandise was mainly due to a doubling of
their world manufactures' trade. The most important sectors
(in terms of substantial market shares in the imports of
developed market economy countries) are textiles and clothing,
office machines and telecommunications equipment, electric
machinery, furniture and footwear.127 From the point of view of
total exports from developing countries, inclusive of Latin
America, the growth in the share of manufactured goods was
more than evident: a doubling from the 26% in 1965 to 53% in
1990.
Sub-Saharan Mrican countries and oil-exporting

126. Herbert G. Grubel, Issues in Free Trade in Services Between Canada and the
United States, in ECONOMIC AsPECTS OF REGIONAL TRADING ARRANGEMENTS 109-124
(David Greenway, Thomas Hyclak, Robert J. Thornton eds., 1989).
127. UNCTAD REPORT, supra note 60, at 71-72.
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developing states continue, however, to export primary
products. 128
Roughly 75% of these manufactured exports from developing
countries to developed market-economy countries originated in
developing East Asia. 129 Fully 53% of developing countries'
total non-fuel exports fmd their way into the three major
developed country markets, namely the United States, Japan
and the European Union. This suggests that the export of
manufactures plays a more prominent role in the interests of
developing countries in the aftermath of the Uruguay Round,
although traditional primary agricultural products and
commodities still constitute a vital component of their
international trade. 130
A "domino effect" played itself out as the Uruguay Round
negotiations wore on. One by one, restrictions to trade in areas
in which the less prosperous economies could not successfully
compete, or even react satisfactorily, were gradually reduced.
The
new
WTO
agreements
consummate
an
"institutionalization" of the lopsided balance of economic
relationships between the "haves" and ''have-nots'', with the
NICs occupying a legal Purgatorio, as they have often been
accused as "free riders" in the erstwhile GATT system.
Increased globalization of the marketplace under the WTO
actually forces an economic survival of the fittest, a "winnertake-all" global marketplace, which may not necessarily be
beneficial to individual economies or their populace, or in the
near term, erect the social safety nets to save those
marginalized by market forces. The balance of concessions in
the Uruguay Round erects a sublime facade of statutory
harmony.
The WTO order perpetuates a standardizing,
homogenizing process, in which transnational corporations,
who profit from standardization and cost efficiencies, and last

128. I.M.D. LITILE, RICHARD N. COOPER, W. MAx CORDEN & SARATH
R.AJAPATIRANA, BOOM, CRISIS AND ADJUSTMENT: THE MACROECONOMIC EXPERIENCE OF
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 13 (1993).
129. UNCTAD REPORT, supra note 60, at 63-64, 115.
130. UNCTAD REPORT, supra note 60, at 65.
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but not least, liberalized trade in goods and services, can thrive
and dominate. 131
If there is any doubt as to the non-altruistic tenor of the

negotiating positions of the developed countries, one need not
look beyond the chronology of events in the Uruguay Round. In
a more or less "official" history of the GATT negotiations, a
former senior official of the GATT Secretariat explains why
trade in services, at some point in the negotiations, became a
focal point of discussion:
A huge attraction for the developed countries was that
international trade in services consisted largely of the activities
at which they were best, and which drew on some of their
greatest assets: banking and insurance, management knowhow, shipping and air transport, advanced communications and
other technology. They argued that they could not accept open
competition in their markets for products such as textiles and
clothing, for which developing countries had important
competitive advantages over them, unless they were allowed to
exercise in world markets their competitive advantage for
services. They also insisted that trade in goods was to an
increasing extent linked with the supply of services, so that
rules and disciplines for services were needed to ensure the
strength of the international trading system as a whole.
Developing countries generally felt themselves to be at a
disadvantage in the area of services, except, possibly, as
suppliers of manpower. To a great extent, they accepted
inclusion of trade in services in the Uruguay Round only
because this was a price they had to pay for negotiations on
other matters of importance to them, and because they preferred
multilaterally agreed rules to the almost certain alternative
prospect of unilateral action by major countries to force open
their markets. 132

131. Helena Norberg-Hodge, Break Up the Monoculture, THE NATION, July 15122,
1996, at 20-23.
132. JOHN CROOME, RESHAPING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 119-120 (World
Trade Organization 1995) (emphasis added).
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Similar reasons accounted for the inclusion of intellectual
property protection into the GATT deliberations:
As in the case of services, developed countries
saw their strength in the development of
technology as a central competitive advantage
on which they would need to be able to rely in
the future, not least if they were being
challenged by developing countries in areas of
trade where they were at a competitive
disadvantage. All participants in the round
soon became aware that an agreement on
TRIPS ("trade-related aspects of intellectual
property rights") was, whether they liked it or
not, an essential element for any final
package. 133
This double standard is prominent in the orientation of the
Uruguay Round agreements. Great strides in the realm of
intellectual property and broad sweeping provisions governing
trade in services dwarf the minor revisions in the provisions of
contingency protection (notably the small modifications to the
anti-dumping provisions).
The structural imbalance is not immediately evident; on the
contrary, it is meant to remain unobtrusive, so long as there is
a semblance of fairness and reasonableness in the rules of
dispute settlement. But when the rules of the "club" are
periodically changed to accommodate the shifting topography of
the world economy, the new assortment of stipulations will
tend to favor one class of countries or entities over another.
Thus, while there is predictability in the enforcement of the
rules within the system, the equity inherent in their
application is questionable. To illustrate this point, this article
discusses some of the salient features of the new intellectual
property rights and services regimes below.

133. [d. at 119·120 (emphasis added).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1999

57

Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 5 [1999], Iss. 1, Art. 6

138
IX.

ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW

[Vol. 5:1

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

Two concerns spurred the United States and the European
Union to attach great importance to intellectual property rights
in their shopping list of concessions. First, many developing
countries - the East Asian NICs conspicuously among them afforded shorter periods of patent protection, allowing domestic
imitations of Western patents to flourish in their domestic
markets. Moreover, enforcement of patent protection in these
countries was severely deficient and vulnerable to
administrative corruption. Second, most developing countries
have tolerated the widespread production and sale of pirated
video and sound reproductions, unauthorized copying of
computer software, and the appropriation of trademarks (or
brand names) in cheap imitations that somehow reduce the
enhanced value of the original products. The American and
European business interests that financed and developed the
innovations in these products have lost billions of dollars.
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS)l34 is the most ambitious,
comprehensive multilateral agreement on intellectual property
ever, incorporating intellectual property right protection as an
integral part of the international trading system embodied in
the WTO. For the first time, the international community has
accepted an agreement covering the broad subject matter of
intellectual property law. TRIPS encompasses the main
categories of intellectual property rights including
copyrights, trademarks, patents, geographical indications,
industrial designs, and trade secrets - and lays down
extensive rules for protection and enforcement. The TRIPS
Agreement also embraces the DSU for resolution of disputes
between WTO members involving substantive rights and
domestic enforcement. All WTO member states, as a condition
for membership, are compelled to abide by TRIPS, as well as

134. WTO AGREEMENT, supra note 81, Annex Ie.
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the other agreements concerning trade in goods, and the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).135

As in the case of pre-existing intellectual property
conventions/36 the TRIPS agreement is not meant to
harmonize all domestic intellectual property laws. Rather,
TRIPS is meant to set minimum standards of protection that
must be followed by the WTO members, which are allowed to
implement these standards in a manner appropriate to their
own legal systems, and even to provide higher levels of
protection than those required.137 The obligations accord
protection to "persons" of other members, which includes
persons, natural or legal, who have close attachment to other
members without necessarily being nationalsp8
The standards set by the TRIPS Agreement largely correspond
to the levels of protection set by major industrial countries.
The main elements of protection are defined, the rights to be
conferred and permissible exceptions are specified, and the
minimum periods of protection are established. In theory at
least, compliance with TRIPS is distinct from conformity with
the pre-existing intellectual property conventions. In practice,
however, the TRIPS Agreement requires, as an initial
condition, that WTO members comply with all substantive
obligations set down by the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) conventions, the Paris and Berne
Conventions in their most recent versions (but not the moral
rights sections of the Berne Convention). All these substantive
obligations are incorporated by reference into TRIPS. In
addition, the TRIPS Agreement includes additional obligations

135. WTO AGREEMENT, supra note 81, Annex 1A (Multilateral Agreements on
Trade in Goods), and Annex 1B (General Agreement on Trade in Services).
136. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, last
revised July 14, 1967,21 D.S.T. 1583, 828 D.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention];
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Words, Sept. 9, 1886, last
revised July 24, 1971,828 D.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention]; International
Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and
Broadcasting Organizations, October 26, 1961, 496 D.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter Rome
Convention]; Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, opened
for signature, May 26,1989,28 LL.M. 1477 [hereinafter IPIC Treaty].
137. TRIPS, supra note 81, art. 1(1).
138. TRIPS, supra note 81, art. 1(3).
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not covered by the prevIOUS

The TRIPS Agreement makes transitional arrangements
available to developing countries, in accordance with their level
of development. Developing countries are given a grace period
of five years to implement their obligations; the least
developing countries are granted a transitional phase of up to
eleven years. 140 National treatment and most-favored nation
obligations, however, are mandatory from January 1, 1996.141
Despite the transitional periods, Article 65(5) prohibits
countries from using the transition periods to reduce levels of
protection inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement. Article 67
thereof provides that developed member states shall provide,
upon request and mutually agreed terms and conditions,
technical and financial cooperation in favor of developing and
least developing countries.
Furthermore, since TRIPS merely provides minimum
standards, it does not give any member state an excuse for
withdrawing from its international obligations under another
intellectual property convention. Some belieVE;) that the TRIPS
Agreement already had de facto effect as an international
norm, even before its formal de jure recognition in Marrakesh
in April 1994. Hence, some argue that TRIPS' has a de facto
effect even before the end of the transitional phase accorded to
the developing states, when they technically accept de jure
responsibility for their obligations.142
Arguably,recognition of intellectual property rights continues
to be the ideal. But from a trade theory perspective, a single,
worldwide intellectual property protection standard may be
neither pragmatic nor rational. Patent protection is a form of
monopoly rent to the innovator that may create a monopoly of
knowledge, by excluding smaller competitors from the market
139. TRIPS, supra note 81, arts. 2(1) & 9(1). For an overview of the salient points
of the TRIPS Agreement, see Adrian Otten & Hannu Wager, Compliance with TRIPS:
The Emerging World View, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 391, 396-397 (1996).
140. TRIPS, supra note 81, arts. 65, 66 & 69.
141. TRIPS, supra note 81, art. 65.
142. Otten & Wager, supra note 139, at 407-409.
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who may be able to imitate and enhance the product to
increase its intrinsic or social value. For developing countries
without a fIrm industrial base, the TRIPS Agreement may
insure an import monopoly for the patented products, and
there would be little incentive for such countries to compete
with the imported technology.143
Trebilcock and Howse rightly assert that "[t]he level of
intellectual property protection each country decides to afford
will thus be rationally related to whether its comparative
advantage resides more in innovation or imitation and
adaptation of innovations made elsewhere, and the relative
weight it gives to the interests of consumers (including its own
producers who are consumers of inputs), imitators, and
innovators."l44 The conventional view is that many countries
agreed to higher intellectual property standards in order to
gain, or maintain, continued access to the developed country
markets that afford stricter protection to intellectual
property. 145 Indeed, this conventional assertion may be the
only realistic viewpoint.146
The high performing economies among the developing
countries possess the industrial capacity to replicate the
foreign technology, and could compete effectively with the
143. Samuel A. Oddi, TRIPS -- Natural Rights and a Polite Form of Economic
Imperialism, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 415, 460 (1996).
144. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & RoBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 248-250 (1995).
145. Edmund W. Kitch, The Patent Policy of Developing Countries, 13 UCLA PAC.
BASIN L.J. 1, 166-167 (1994).
146. Edmund Kitch contends that developing countries should be motivated to join
the world intellectual property system based largely on the American model simply
because it is in their self-interest to do so. He writes: "If patent protection is weak or
non-existent, industries will develop that rely for their existence on their ability to
ignore the international patent system. Once these industries have developed, they
have an interest in resisting any change in the rules. Although it may be in the
overall, long run interest of the country to participate in both form and substance in
the international patent system, the adversely affected industries will have incentives
to expend their political capital to keep that from happening." Kitch, supra note 145,
at 178. While this argument appears to be logical, experience has shown that once the
East Asian NIC industries have determined that it is in their interest to participate in
the intellectual property system for their own trade advantage, then they do so. The
main point advanced here is that need and interest dictate, and will continue to dictate,
the decision to conform to the imposed intellectual property standard, and not because
of any perceived intrinsic value in conforming to it.
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creators of the technology.147 If forced to comply with TRIPS,
the NICs would suffer losses in the immediate term, since
enforcement of intellectual property laws would retard copying
the technology. However, a strong technological base would
enable them to produce their own adapted technology. Thus, in
the long run, the worldwide patent system, may be beneficial to
the NICs. 148
Nevertheless, it is the height of naivete to assume that the less
developed WTO members, with hardly the technological
capacity to innovate or even to replicate inventions, and with a
limited market, can benefit from increased protection. With no
industrial infrastructure or efficient administrative system,
patent protection of first world technology would provide no
long-term advantage to less developed countries. Unless
TRIPS concretely aids the industrialization efforts of the
developing countries and confers upon their consumers
sufficient disposable income to purchase such inventions, the
economic benefits of TRIPS will accrue mainly to the developed
countries 149 and to those industrializing countries where
intellectual property protection has gained a comparative
advantage. Evidently, this is not the overriding objective of the
. TRIPS Agreement, which is to increase economic welfare
through freer trade; if it were, imposing foreign legal standards
on unwilling states in the name of harmonization would be a
sophisticated form ofneo-imperialism. 150
A strict enforcement of the TRIPS agreement would, in an age
of rapid technological innovation, reduce the number of options
available to a country to respond to the influx of imported
patented or copyrighted technology.
Trade-off's between

147. Oddi, supra note 143, at 458.
148. [d. at 459.
149. [d.

150. This turn of phrase is derived from a statement of Steven P. Ladas in 1975,
and was popularized in much of the intellectual property law literature by the scholar
Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in International Trade: Opportunities and
risks of a GATT Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 747, 813 (1989). According to
Reichman, "[i]mposition of foreign legal standards on unwilling states in the name of
'harmonization' remains today what Ladas deemed it in 1975, namely, a polite form of
economic imperialism," citing STEVEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED
RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 14-15 (1975).
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innovation and imitation differ from country to country,
depending on whether innovation is a major source of economic
growth. 151
From this economic viewpoint, it is neither
unreasonable nor unethical for many developing countries to
have preferred a less stringent intellectual property regime.
Since some of these countries often lack the assets to create
their own intellectual property, obliging them to provide
intellectual property protection for foreign entities is
tantamount to requiring them to favor foreign over domestic
interests. Furthermore, most intellectual property laws in
these environments are instituted to protect domestic
intellectual property holders, and not for the benefit of foreign
intellectual property. 152
In East Asia, as well as in other parts of the world, the nations
that are least developed economically are those that favor the a
low level of intellectual property, while the more economically
developed ones adhere to a regime somewhat approaching the
Western standards. 153 All indications suggest that it is the
level of economic development, and not any definitive economic
policy or strategy that determines the degree of devotion to
intellectual property protection. It is a fact that East Asian
nations such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and
China, flourished economically because of their supposedly
"unauthorized" use of copyrighted foreign technology.1M
The other factor to consider in this context is that the concept
of intellectual property rights is a European construct, which
may not be germane to a particular socio-cultural environment.
In East Asia, Chinese Confucianism continues to exert a strong

151. TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 144, at 251.
152. Paul C.B. Liu, U.S. Industry's Influence on Intellectual Property Negotiations
and Special 301 Actions, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 87, 92 (1994).
153. William P. Alford, How Theory Does -- and Does Not .. Matter: American
Approaches to Intellectual Property Law in East Asia, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 8, 15
(1994).
154. Id. at 16. Duane W. Layton, Japan and the Introduction of Foreign
Technology: A Blueprint for Less Developed Countries?, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 171 (1982);
Sang-Hyun Song & Seong-Ki Kim, The Impact of Multilateral Trade Negotiations on
Intellectual Property Laws in Knrea, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 118 (1994); Chung-Sen
Yang & Judy Y.C. Chang, Recent Developments in Intellectual Property Law in the
Republic of China, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 70 (1994).
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influence in the legal culture. The countries at the forefront of
the East Asian economic miracle have all been profoundly
influenced by Confucian values, which have either consciously
or unconsciously aided in their economic development.155
Confucianism's model of a good society is one based on mutual
consideration of the needs of others. 156 Ideas or creations are
not owned by their progenitors but are to be deemed part of the
public domain. In most of the East Asian NICs influenced by·
the Confucian ethic, the interaction of individuals and society
is valued as much as an individual's rights. This is reflected to
varying degrees in the formulation of their intellectual
property laws.
Adherence to higher standards of intellectual property
protection came about within these countries, not through
belated enlightenment to the virtues of such protection, but
simply as a pragmatic response to a changing business
environment.
When it became competitively viable or
politically necessary to embrace stricter levels of intellectual
property protection, laws were revised or overhauled to adjust
to the realities of the international marketplace. However,
attitudes toward such protection did not necessarily change,
nor did they have to change. Hence, enforcement of strict
intellectual property laws remains a different issue - and
problem, - altogether. Moreover, these legislative conversions
occurred after a period of time during which intellectual
property was not protected in the Western, non-Confucian
sense, which allowed such countries to innovate from Western
technologies and improve the pace of their economic
development.
In most cases, the development of intellectual property law
accelerates when the country's economy requires it, either
because it is necessary to guarantee access to an important
export market, or when its level of technological prowess
necessitates higher protection of intellectual resources. Before
this "comfort level" is reached, imposing higher levels of
155. Umehara Takeshi, The Civilization of the Forest, 7 NEW PERSPECTIVES
QUARTERLY 3, 29-30 (1990).
.
156. JONATHAN D. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHlNA 8-60 (1990).
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protection may, in fact, impede economic development. At
worst, it can reinforce a developing country's lower state of
economic development uls-a-uis richer developed and
developing countries. Some examples follow to illustrate this
thesis.
Under the Japanese patent system, which constitutes a
keystone to her industrial success, the Japanese took
advantage of the exploitation-of-invention scheme, and paid
little attention to the protection-of-invention guaranteed by the
U.S. patent system. The Japanese patent system presumes
that inventions can be made by industries and corporations,
and not only by individuals. The objective of exploiting
inventions is "the free dissemination of information and the
guarantee of competitors' rights to "invent around" published
inventions and exploit technology in the public domain."157
Technology is something to be shared and distributed; the goal
of development is not the fortune of any particular inventor,
but constant innovation, which goal is best served by making
technological information available to all. 158
In South Korea, conventional attitudes toward such rights have
not changed greatly, even though intellectual property laws
have been strengthened due to outside pressure to conform to
some standardized system. Without a perception of and
conviction regarding the importance of intellectual property
rights, enforcement can be difficult.159 South Korea was
induced to upgrade intellectual property protection when
foreign investors turned to the second-tier NICs in Southeast
Asia for more lucrative opportunities. At that point, South
Korea needed higher technology industries to sustain its
economic growth. 160
Patent protection encouraged the
pharmaceutical industry to engage in more research and
development, enacted legislation for compulsory licensing of

157. Toshiko Takenaka, The Role of the Japanese Patent System in Japanese
Industry, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 25, 29 (1994).
158. Dan Rosen & Chikako Usui, The Social Structure of Japanese Intellectual
Property Law, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 32, 50-51 (1994).
159. For an exposition of South Korean intellectual property protection, see Song &
Kim, supra note 154, at 118, 120-121 (1994).
160. Id. at 119, 138.
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registered semiconductor chip layout-design, and spurred the
growth of the publishing and software industries.161
Taiwan is not a signatory to any international convention,
including the GATT, WTO and the international property
conventions. But in the past years, Taiwan has taken steps to
speed up the pace of protecting intellectual property rightS.162
Often, it has to rely on bilateral negotiations to resolve its
trade disputes in the international community. Taiwan is
especially sensitive to U.S. pressure, because of its large trade
surplus with the U.S. and the threat of retaliatory measures
under the Special 301 provisions of the Omnibus Trade Act. l63

x.

THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN
SERVICES (GATS)

The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) breaks
new ground, since it represents the first extension of the global
multilateral trade regime to cover the liberalization of trade
and investment in services. On average, services now account
for nearly three-fourths of the production and employment in
industrialized countries. Although the role of services in the
global economy is increasing, the service sector is protected in
both developed and developing countries, usually through
domestic regulatory regimes. Because services are not tangible
like goods, they are not affected by tariff barriers, and thus
require another trade framework for their international
regulation. With the incorporation of GATS into the world
trade order, the WTO advances the philosophy that the
institutional control of services is necessary to remove
impediments to the free flow of services and thereby accelerate
The GATS attempts to lay
global economic growth.

161. Id. at 127-128, 134-137.
162. For the latest developments in IPR in Taiwan, see Yang & Chang, supra note
154.
163. For an overview of Special 301 actions against Asian countries, see Liu, supra
note 152, at 113-116.
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international ground rules for governmental actions affecting
transactions in services. l64
The GATS is based a framework agreement that defines the
obligations of the WTO members. It also includes: schedules of
specific commitments made by each WTO member in regard to
specific sectors, sub-sectors, or activities, which mayor may not
be subject to particular qualifications; eight annexes that
address sector-specific or horizontal matters; and Ministerial
Decisions pertaining to the establishment of work programs for
trade in professional services and terms of reference for future
negotiations on maritime transport services.165

164. It is not the intent of this section to explore the scope of the GATS in detail,
but merely to point out its features in relation to the basic theses of this article. For a
concise discussion on the GATS see Bernard Hoekman & Pierre Sauve, Liberalizing
Trade in Services, 243 WORLD BANK DISCUSSION PAPERS (World Bank 1994). Other
authors on the GATS include: Aaditya Mattoo, National Treatment in the GATS:
Corner-Stone or Pandora's Box, 31 J. WORLD TRADE 107 (1997); L. Altinger & A
Enders, The Scope and Death of GATS Commitments, 19 WORLD ECONOMY 307 (1996);
A. Ahnlid, Comparing GATT and GATS: Regime Creation under and after Hegemony, 3
REV. INT'L POL. ECON. 650 (1994); P. Low, Impact of the Uruguay Round on Asia: Trade
in Services and Trade Related Investment Measures, Paper Presented at the Asian
Development Bank Conference on the Impact of the Uruguay Round on Asia, Manila,
Philippines (1995).
165.' The World Trade Organization Financial Services Agreement (FSA),
completed on December 13, 1997, included market-opening commitments by 102 WTO
members, which take effect in early 1999. Article 1 of GATS enumerates the following
measures affecting trade in services:
(a) cross-border: from the territory of one Member into the
territory of any other Member;
(b) consumption abroad: in the territory of one Member to the
service consumer of any other Member;
(c) commercial presence: by a service supplier of one Member,
through commercial presence in the territory of any other Member;
(d) presence of natural persons: by a service supplier of one
Member, through presence of natural persons of a Member in the
territory of any other Member.
In summary, Article XVI of GATS stipulates that in measures where market-access
commitments are undertaken, measures which a Member shall not maintain or adopt
either on a regional or national basis, unless otherwise specified in its schedule of
commitments, include limitations on:
(a)
(b)

the number of service suppliers;
the total value of service transactions or assets;
(c)
the total number of service operations or the total quantity of
service outputs;
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The GATS Agreement covers all possible modes of supplying
services. Under the Most Favored Nation (MFN) rule in Article
II of the GATS Agreement, WTO members commit to treat
services provided by one member state in the same way as
services from any other member. However, the same article
allows members to maintain measures inconsistent with MFN
treatment provided that the measure is listed and meets the
conditions of the Annex on Article II Exceptions, the latter to
be further negotiated in subsequent liberalizing rounds. Due
to concerns of service providers in developed countries that an
unconditional MFN "would allow countries with restrictive
policies to maintain the status quo and Ofree ride' in the
markets of more open countries," MFN derogations were left in
the agreement, especially in the areas of telecominunications,t66
financial services/67 maritime transport, audio-visual services
and air transport. l68 The MFN derogations set forth in the
Annex on Article II Exemptions, are generally not to exceed a
period of ten years, and shall be subject to negotiation in
subsequent trade liberalization rounds.
While the spirit of the GATS Agreement aims to embrace
practically all dimensions of the services sector, the obligations
enumerated in the Agreement are triggered only if a member
state schedules a particular commitment.
Free trade in
services exists only if the mode of supply in a specific sector is
(d) the total number of natural persons that may be employed in
a particular sector;
(e) restricting and requiring specific types of legal entity or joint
venture which a service supplier may supply;
(0
foreign equity participation in terms of maximum percentage
limit.
166. No agreement on basic telecommunications could be reached when GATS and
the WTO agreements were signed in Marrakesh in 1994. On February 15, 1997, sixtynine countries taking part in the Group on Basic Telecommunications - a negotiating
group within the WTO - reached an agreement covering basic telecommunication
services. The agreement takes the form of a Protocol to be attached to the GATS, and
is officially designated as the Fourth Protocol of the GATS. For a detailed elaboration
of the telecommunications agreement. See C.E.J. Bronckers & Pierre Larouche,
Telecommunications Services and the World Trade Organization, 31 J. WORLD TRADE
L. 5 (1997).
167. See Yi Wang, Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment under the General Agreement
on Trade in Services -- and its Application in Financial Services, 30 J. WORLD TRADE L.
91 (1996).
168. Pierre Sauve, Assessing the General Agreement on Trade in Services, Half-Full
or Half-Empty?, 29 J. WORLD TRADE L. 125, 130-131 (1995).
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schedule.

Moreover, the obligation to treat foreign service suppliers the
same way as domestic foreign suppliers, which is the national
treatment obligation in the GATTIWTO, is not an all pervasive
rule under the GATS Agreement. While sectoral coverage is
universal, the schedules may be qualified by limitations on the
national treatment obligation. National treatment only applies
selectively to sectors and activities, pursuant to the terms and
conditions stated by each individual member country in its
schedule of commitments. The GATS Agreement acknowledges
that treatment of foreign and domestic suppliers may not
always be identical, provided the competitive conditions facing
foreign suppliers do not deteriorate. Uncertainty as to the
precise meaning of the national treatment obligation, and the
resulting differences in interpretation of the scope and extent
of these obligations, may forestall the GATS' objective of
creating a predictable trading environment for services.169
Thus, while incorporation of the GATS into the GATTIWTO
architecture does shift the center of gravity from trade in goods
towards services, the core of GATS is more fluid than defmite,
and depends largely on the relative relationships among
member states, embodied in their schedules of commitment.
The schedules of commitment involve a multilevel interplay of
sectors, modes of supply and activities, and are qualified by a
continuous negotiation for exemptions and limitations. Thus
the GATS Agreement, in the long run, depends once again on
the relative negotiating positions and comparative strengths of
the parties vis-a-vis each other, as well as on their relationship
to the whole corpus of GATS commitments. Further, if no
schedules of commitment are made in any particular sector or
sub-sector, then no liberalization of services takes place. The
GATS does not require a change in the regulatory environment
of the member states. If liberalization allows market access for
outside suppliers, but is not matched by an antitrust policy to
enhance competition, then the effect of openness in the service

169. See the extensive discussion in Mattoo, supra note 164, at 198.
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sector would not be felt.17O Developing countries will have to
decide how quickly to integrate their economies with the rest of
the world. However, as the Asian crisis demonstrates, such
integration will hold dangers if the doors are suddenly swung
open to foreign capital, without efficient financial
infrastructures to control their flow.
The making of the rules, therefore, relies on the makers of the
rules. This is not to say that GATS is hopelessly flawed. As
with any new major liberalization thrust, the process towards
its ultimate objective is a gradual one. What is significant here
is that the complex interplay of power interrelationships
between member states intrudes on the theoretical "rule of
law" balance advocated by the GATS.
XI.

THE EAST ASIAN ECONOMIC CRISIS

The East Asian NICs will pay a heavy price as a consequence of
the recent East Asian economic crisis, whether or not they are
to blame.l7l In the context of the necessary devaluations of

170. Bernard Hoekman, Assessing the General Agreement on Trade, in SERVICES IN
BANK DISCUSSION PAPERS, No. 307, 327, 348-349 (Will Martin & L. Alan
Winters eds., 1995).
171. The East Asian financial shock began with Thailand's currency devaluation
against the dollar in July of 1997. Prior to decline of the baht, foreign lenders poured
money into Thailand because of its surging economy. Thais borrowed abroad because
of lower rates, in U.S. dollars. Flush with foreign money, Thai financial institutions
lent heavily. Some customers borrowed in dollars, not anticipating that the baht would
lose value against the dollar. Others squandered their loans on non-productive
investments. When foreign investors became worried about the Thais' ability to repay,
they began moving their money out of Thailand and converted their money from baht
to dollars. At first, the Thai central bank tried to prop up the baht by buying up baht
with its dollar reserves and raising its interest rates to discourage baht sales. By July,
the Thai central bank began to run out of dollars until it stopped defending its
currency.
The debacle in Thailand affected investors and borrowers in neighboring Southeast
Asian nations who shared Thailand's problems of high foreign debt and questionable
lending practices.
People in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines started
converting their currencies into dollars until the ringgit, rupiah and peso fell in value.
The panic spread to Hong Kong, causing a fall in stock prices. Hong Kong, however,
was able to keep its currency value against the dollar because the Chinese central
bank, with its $88 billion in foreign reserves, was able to defend the Hong Kong dollar.
Korea suffered next because, like the other countries, its development was fueled by
heavy borrowing. In November 1997, the won collapsed. Later, the Japanese
securities giant Yamaichi collapse, calling attention to Japan's wobbly financial
WORLD
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various East Asian currencies and the draconian measures
required by the International Monetary Fund and the United
States to restructure the economies, continued liberalization is
a double-edged sword. On the one hand, these strategies will
ensure that foreign investors will still be predisposed to
consider increased investments in these East Asian economies.
On the other hand, the East Asian countries affected will have
to play another game of "catch up" once again, under global
trading rules that will maintain the comparative advantage of
the higher technology and more advanced economies.
Currency devaluations will naturally make manufactured
goods from East Asia even cheaper to the West, and leave
profits depressed in the manufacturing industries. Until such
time as exchange rate adjustments clear the huge glut of
manufacturing capacity born out of the export-driven strategies
of the East Asian NICs, the tradeable goods will eventually
have to be unloaded on the less affected, developed country
markets, pushing prices downward. As an Asian country's
currency falls, the competitiveness of its products is enhanced,
which puts pressure on the currencies of its competitors.172
Trade friction will almost certainly ensue, because the
deflationary trend would provoke larger trade deficits with the
United States and Europe.173 The United States has already
experienced this downturn in exports in its shipments of goods
to the region, including Japan, China and Australia.174 This, in
turn, might well provoke the use of contingency protectionist -

system, where banks are also affected by a mountain of bad debt. Asia's Financial
Shock: How it Began and What Comes Next, WALL ST. J., November 26, 1997, at All.
. 172. Martin Feldstein, Japan's Folly Drags Asia Down, WALL ST. J., November 25,
1997, at A22. This article encapsulates Japan's role in the East Asian crisis, which
more or less reflects the basic flaws of the Japanese model of development. It notes
that "[ilt was therefore Japanese monetary and banking policies that encouraged and
facilitated the large current account deficits of Southeast Asia and of South Korea. The
low interest rates offered by the Japanese banks and their relatively lax credit
standards made it possible for Asian borrowers to incur large amounts of foreign debt,
much of it denominated in dollars. .The Japanese banks were eager to lend abroad
because of the low interest rates and weak demand for credit at home. And they liked
lending in dollars because of the higher interest rate receipts. When the yen fell
relative to the dollar, however, many Asian borrowers found that they could no longer
service their debts." [d.
173. Global Growth at a Crossroads, Bus. WK., November 24,1997, at 190.
174. Symptoms of the Asian Flu are Showing Up, Bus. WK., April 6, 1998, at 31.
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particularly anti-dumping - measures still built into the WTO
system, and worse, make the threat to use unilateral trade
measures more palatable to policy-makers in the advanced
economies. 175 The Director General of the WTO specifically
addressed these concerns in his remarks in April 1998 at the
joint Asian Development BankIWorld Trade Organization
seminar:
A more real concern is what might be termed
creeping protectionism - any unwarranted or
excessive use of safeguards, antidumping
actions or other discretionary policy tools to
block out international competition. We in the
WTO are watching the situation very carefully.
To date there is no evidence of any protectionist
measures being taken. But the trade effects of
the crisis are only now beginning to be felt.
Widening trade deficits could provoke
protectionist sentiment; this must be resisted
and we will continue to monitor developments
. carefully.176
What the Director General failed to mention, although
immediately obvious, is that only the developed WTO member
states have the political and economic wherewithal and the
sophisticated legislative infrastructure to apply these
"discretionary policy tools" to the goods of the affected
developing country members. To reiterate, this is a lingering
indication of the lopsided balance of interests inherent in the
WTO system and the diminished capacity of the weaker states
to influence the further revision of the rules that comprise the
"rule-of-Iaw" architecture of the GATTIWTO system.
The defeat of proposed "fast-track" legislation in the U.S.
Congress demonstrates the erosion of support for free trade, at
least within the legislative branch of the United States, and

175. The Curse of Contagion, FIN. TIMES, Weekend November 22lNovember 23,

1997, at 6.
176. WTO

Website, Director General's Opening Remarks, The Joint ADBIWTO
Seminar, April 29, 1998 <http://www.wto.orglwto/new/adb_wto.htm>.
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may presage the freer use of economic sanctions against target
countries. 177 The U.S. Congress has already imposed trade
sanctions against Burma. Other Southeast Asian countries
may be potential targets, since their government policies or
laws conflict with U.S. labor, environmental, human rights or
religious standards.178
In an expected display of Schadenfreude, some economists and
pundits have been quick to point out that the crisis in Asia
confirms the repudiation of the unique Asian model based on
Japan's phenomenal success, which "combined the dynamism
of the market with the advantages of centralized government
planning.,,179 In plain language, "politicians picked industries
to support; business leaders duly investment in them; and
banks put up the money."l80 Ostensibly, the collapse of the
East Asian bubble exhibits many of the features of oversuch
as
over-investment,
non-productive
expansion,
investments, poor lending practices, overly rapidly credit
growth, unsustainable economic policies, and even conspicuous
consumption. 1S1 Furthermore, the much heralded closeness or
coziness of the government and industry which guaranteed
astonishing economic growth, also led to exploitation by
political leaders (corruption) and the relaxation of rules

177. For an overview of fast-track legislation, see I.M. DESTLER, RENEWING FASTTRACK LEGISLATION (Institute for International Economics 1997).
178. Paul Craig Roberts, A Growing Menace to Free Trade: U.s. Sanctions, Bus.
WK., November 24,1997, at 28.
179. Asian Economies: More Myth than Miracle?, THE WASHINGTON POST,
November 25,1997, at 1.
180. Stumbling Giants, TIME, November 24,1997, at 74.
181. An editorial in the Financial Times succinctly encapsulates the crisis:
Fast growth encouraged over-dependence on debt. It also raised
the prices of land, inducing massive debt-financed investment in poorquality projects. Where exchange rates had been fixed, much of this
borrowing was in foreign exchange. Such rickety financial structures
can survive only as long as rapid growth and stable exchange rates
also do. Once these underlying conditions disappear, lenders find
their collateral impaired and the sale of assets by bankrupt borrowers
further reduces its value. Bad debts grow, while foreign lenders flee.
The weakening currency induces a rush into safe havens abroad.
Once this happens, intrinsically sound borrowers can easily be pushed
into bankruptcy. Investment halts and growth slows down even
more, further aggravating the panic.

A Threat to the World, FIN. TIMES, November 20,1997, atA13.
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pertaining to lending and the disclosure of financial
information. 182 It should not be forgotten, however, that much
of Asian business practice was, and is still based on personal
contact and trust which have their roots in the traditional
values of the ethnic Chinese which dominate much of the
commerce of the region. l83 It can be said that what Asia
suffered from was too much growth, and over-ambitious
economic planning, in other words, that it had exceeded the
optimum level of growth.l84 Banks had become not merely
lenders, but investors in many failed enterprises. If Asian
business practices have to be modified, then they should indeed
be altered. But this does not constitute a blanket repudiation
of traditional ways of doing business, rather, it points out their
incongruity with the more complex and demanding
requirements of transparency and risk analysis in the global
economy.
The prominent economist Jeffrey Sachs, Director of the
Harvard Institute for International Development, claims that
Asia's crisis was caused by the panicky outflow of international
capital, rather than by any fundamental weakness. He has
been quoted as stating, "[w]hat we have experienced is massive
inflows based on high optimism about the region followed by
massive outflows that one can only characterize as a panic....
While it is fashionable to talk about the crony capitalism in
Asia and the myths of East Asian economic performance, I
believe that - while those weaknesses are real- they cannot
begin to account for the collapse.,,185
Despite the flaws that have surfaced in this Japanese-inspired
model of development - now criticized as only a good "catchup" model - it was the only viable model at the time that could
enable the former primary producers of East Asia to break into
the world economy and compete effectively.
While the

182. [d. at A13; East Asia Swallows its Pride, FIN. TIMES, November 24, 1997, at
27.

183. Culture Shock, FAR E. ECON. REV, April 16, 1998, at 54-55.
184. What Asia May Need is Far Slower Growth, WALL ST. J., November 3, 1997, at
1.
185. Quoted in Nayan Chanda, Rebuilding Asia, FAR E. ECON. REV, February 12,
1998, at 48.
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emergence of another model may be necessary to lift the East
Asian NICs out of the doldrums - for example one modeled on
a paradigm of good governance, transparency and fiscal
discipline - the decline of the East Asian juggernaut does not
render its unique approach to development any less useful.
What occurred was simply a degeneration of the Asian model of
development due to the lack of checks and balances, which are
a prerequisite to success in the global economy.
In this period of East Asian decline, many have forgotten that
many economists and other scholars from both East and West
wrote volumes extolling the East Asian miracle, and that
politicians and statesmen from other regions sought to emulate
the East Asian example by initiating similar trade policies. In
the few months prior to the East Asian collapse, the IMF and
World Bank praised the East Asian economies, and cited their
"sound fundamentals" budget surpluses, balance of
payments, high savings, low inflation and export-oriented
industries. When the Asian bubble "burst" the IMF reverted to
its "I-told-you-so" attitude and prescribed its usual mix of
draconian cuts in social spending, devaluation of the currency,
raising of interest rates, and opening the domestic economies to
foreign ownership. The bottom line of many IMF prescriptions
is to protect the interests of creditors, even to the detriment of
the debtor nations. 186
.
The myth of the East Asian Miracle is as attributable to the
foreign investors who saw large opportunities in Asia, as it is to
the economic policies of the countries themselves. The East
Asian Miracle would not have occurred, if the already
developed countries and the multinational financial
institutions had refused to fuel its growth. Between 1993 and
1996, money managers from the United States, Europe and
Japan pumped short-term foreign credit into Thailand,
Indonesia and Malaysia. By the end of 1996, according to an

186. Joseph Stiglitz, chief economist of the World Bank, is an ardent critic of IMF
austerity policies. He argues that the IMF bailout conditions in East Asia might cause
a "severe recession" and were not necessary for macro-stability or long-term
development. See Soren Ambrose, The IMF Has Gotten Too Big for Its Riches , THE
WASHINGTON POST, April 26, 1998, at C2.
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IMF estimate, European banks had lent $318 billion, and their
Japanese and American counterparts $260 billion and $46
billion respectively, to the East Asian countries. When the
crisis broke in Asia, mutual fund investments in the region
stood at $38.5 billion. Foreign banks frequently lent blindly,
with little or no due diligence, due to the competitive pressures
and the erstwhile attractiveness of the region.1S7 In other
words, the fall of the East Asian tigers could be attributed not
only to the bad governance on the part of the East Asian
governments, but also to the pressures of financial
globalization as well.
For example, in the three years leading up to the cnS1S,
Thailand had savings to support 6.7% growth, but with foreign
loans and investment, could grow at 8.2% on average.
Malaysia's potential growth rate was 7.5% for 1993 to 1996, but
was fueled to 9% with foreign lending. Indonesia's real growth
averaged about 7.8%, compared to its potential growth of 7.2%.
Foreign investors pumped loans into Asia despite plunging
returns. But a majority of those loans were short-term. Hence,
the accumulation of maturing loans was the proximate cause of
the crisis.
The Asian crisis can also be viewed as a kind of a bank-run, in
which international banks deserted their borrowers when
international confidence in the Asian currencies declined.
Developed markets were the primary export targets of these
NICs, whose domestic markets were small and relatively
unsophisticated, but the export-led strategy would have failed
if the goods had not been priced competitively and thus were
not welcomed by the importing nations.
The APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) meeting held in
Vancouver, Canada in 1997 merely reiterated APEC's avowed
mission to liberalize trade among eighteen Pacific Rim nations,
including the United States, Canada, Japan, Korea and China,
and the troubled Southeast Asian economies such as Thailand,
Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines. At this meeting, the

187. Rebuilding Asia, FAR E. ECON. REV, February 12, 1998, at 47.
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leaders renewed their commitment to opening their markets to
one another, instead of reacting to the crisis by becoming more
protectionist. However, one cannot gloss over the fact that the
definition of "liberalization" is elastic. While some countries
wanted firm timetables for cutting tariffs, a number of Asian
countries declared that liberalization need only involve
"economic and technical cooperation" with other members, and
that decisions on the reductions be made voluntarily, and not
by all countries. In the long run, what matters are the detailed
work programs to be hammered out during the six months
after the summit. It is certain that the events in East Asia in
the near term will affect the final scheme to be formulated. l88
Thus, the general commitment to liberalization manifested
during the forum may not be a sufficient guarantee.
The APEC nations also gave their blessing to allow the
International Monetary Fund to dictate the terms needed to
rehabilitate the ailing economies. 189 The bitter medicine the
IMF intends to impose are measures to reduce wasteful
subsidies, eliminate pork-barrel projects, close insolvent banks,
and adopt other politically unpopular belt-tightening policies
that seem anathema to the close relationships between the
government and private sector in many East Asian
economies. 190 There are critics, however, who believe that the
IMF prescriptions actually "punish the victim" and that the
stringent measures (e.g., fiscal austerity and high interest
rates) might transform a "temporary lapse in investor
confidence into a full-blown global recession" and ultimately do
more harm than goOd. 191
Paradoxically, China has been shielded from the Asian
economic downturn because it is not a member of the World
Trade Organization, and hence it is outside the international
economic order. China could thus still protect its domestic

188. Elastic Approach to Free Trade, FIN. TIMES, November 24,1997, at 3.
189. Summit Stresses Trade, Leaving Bailouts to IMF, THE WASHINGTON POST,
November 27, 1997, at B1l.
190. Id. at B12.
191. Critics Challenge IMF's Plan for Asia, WASH. POST, November 29, 1997, at C1C2.
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manufacturers as it maintains its outward-looking export
strategy. And since China's currency is not fully convertible, it
is partly immune from the currency speculation that caused an
outflow of investment from the Asian region. 192 By contrast,
the Asian region, as a whole, has already been devalued as an
emerging stock market region, having been overtaken not only
by Latin America but also by Eastern Europe. 193 Unlike the
Mexican currency crisis, the East Asian malaise reflects the
inherent flaws of the "catch-up" system, and requires a drastic
alteration of its development approach if it is to conform to the
rules of global economy. It will be difficult for the economically
afflicted countries in Asia to reform on their own, without an
international, multilateral component that can help support
the tough changes necessary to restructure the financial and
developmental systems. 194
More concretely, the effects of the Asian currency turmoil will
be noticed in the inability of the governments to make
politically sensitive commitments in areas which have been
increasingly linked to trade, such as the environmental and
labor standards. For instance, global talks on liberalization of
the financial services market are expected to receive weaker
commitments from the affected Asian states.195 The WTO
dispute settlement system, in light of this crisis, will become
either more important or more a nuisance than ever. It will
either serve as the last resort of Asian industrializing countries
buffeted by the decline of the East Asian miracle economies, or
will yield to a resurgence of negotiated settlements outside the
WTO framework.
The latter alternative may be more
. prevalent in an economic crisis, when the constraints of the
system are too restrictive. What is certain is that the East
Asian problem will cause a dislocation of the notion of
balancing interests that is distinctive to the WTO design. To

192. China's Trade Barriers Provide Shelter in Asia's Storm, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
November 26,1997, at 18.
193. Asia's Emerging Markets Fall Back, FIN. TIMES, November 28, 1997, at 19.
194. See Karl D. Jackson, Introduction: The Roots of the Crisis, in AsIAN
CONTAGION: THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF A FINANCIAL CRISIS 1, 23 (Karl D.
Jackson ed., 1999).
195. Better Offers Expected at WTO Financial Services Talks, FIN. TIMES,
November 11, 1997, at 6.
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date, the resolution of disputes appears to be moving forward
at an accelerated pace, considering the large number of cases
filed by non-traditional claimants. But the decided cases at
both panel report and Appellate Body levels demonstrate that
no fundamental test case involving a clash between the East
Asian panoply of trade interests, on the one hand, and the
sophisticated trade protection measures of the developed
countries, on the other, has yet arisen. It remains to be seen
whether countries in the WTO scheme will continue to
subordinate their national interests, and the narrow group
interests embraced therein, to the survival of the global trading
order in its present asymmetric configuration.
XII. CONCLUSION
The primary purpose of this article is to illustrate in detail how
the purportedly rule-based system of the GATTIWTO trading
order is not, in reality, truly a system based on the rule oflaw.
Rather, it is a formally rule-based system that co-exists with a
trade regime that is still based on the relative economic and
political power-based relationships among the member states.
The entire proliferating corpus of rules and trade law
"jurisprudence" has created a mainstream philosophy that
advances the notion that the global trading order is, indeed,
moving towards a rule of law scheme. When used in connection
with the new linkages between trade and non-trade issues, rule
of law is really a euphemism for further concessions by East
Asian NICs to the American and European agendas in the new
"millennium round" of global trade negotiations, slated for the
year 2000.
Given the troubled state of many Asian economies, further
liberalization under the existing trade regime might actually
worsen the economic turmoil and could, as the IMF
prescriptions, add fuel to the fire still raging in the region's
economies.
Having to open various sectors of their economies to foreign
competition could not come at a worse time for the recovering
East Asian economies. The issues currently under discussion
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are sensitive areas of immediate concern to the developing
nations, including agriculture, services, intellectual property
rights, labor and children's rights, subsidies, anti-bribery
measures, trade and competition policy, and the environment.
Even a cursory consideration of these matters would lead to
another clash between severely weakened East Asian
negotiators and the visibly strengthened hand of the main
supporters of the existing trade order.196 The ongoing fire sale
of the regional "crown jewels" - the regional keiretsus,
chaebols or multinational industrial complexes - might even
spark a backlash if foreign companies would tend to dominate
the local industries. 197 South Korea's long history of foreign
invasion and colonialism has bred a deep-seated "us-versusthem" mentality, which ,stands as a road block to foreigners
trying to gain access to Korea's insulated economy, although
this might be the only option available to save debt-ridden
chaebols and banks on the verge of bankruptcy. The IMF's
bailout program, which involves the extension of more than $57
billion to ease a $187 billion overseas debt, requires Korea to
fling open the doors not only of its conglomerates, but also of its
domestic stock and bond markets. 19B
The only viable alternative to the "defensive" posture of the
developing nations is the more "assertive" approach suggested
by a trade expert of the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD), who proposes a more equitable
exchange of concessions between the Pacific states and the
United States and Europe. For example, the Cairns group of
agricultural countries could demand better access to European
Union markets and the elimination of market-distorting
agricultural subsidies, in exchange for receptivity in the area of
services and more vigorous implementation of intellectual
property rights. East and South Asian countries could push for
increased tariff liberalization in textiles, electronics and
chemicals, to counteract concessions in trade/environment and
pro-transparency, anti-corruption domestic policies which, after

196. See Shada Islam, The Heat is On, FAR E. ECON. REV., May 21, 1998, at 6l.
197. Few Takers So Far at Asia's Great Firesale, FARE. ECON. REV., March 5, 1998,
at 52-54.
198. Unlocking the Citadel, FAR E. ECON. REV., March 26, 1998, at 10-12.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol5/iss1/6

80

Hizon: Virtual Reality and Reality

1999]

VIRTUAL REALITY AND REALITY

161

all, cannot be effectively implemented by the enforcement
mechanisms of an international body such as the WTO. Most
important, a modus vivendi should be sought, once and for all,
to reduce, if not eliminate the pernicious' effects of antidumping legislation in the European Union, and to shift the
focus of the debate towards negotiations on global competition
rules. 199
The WTO noted in the latest Annual Report by the DirectorGeneral that, despite the Asian crisis, there have been no
major trade policy reversals, and there is little evidence of
market closings in the world, not even in those countries
directly affected by the financial crisis. Not only are the
multilateral commitments under the Uruguay Round generally
respected, but a large majority of countries have recently
signed the new Agreements on Trade in Financial Services and
on Telecommunication Services, and have committed
themselves to the Declaration on Trade in Information
Technology Products (ITA). At the same time, however, the
WTO's Annual Report admits that "[t]rade frictions between
major trading partners seem also to be on the rise. While these
tensions are localized and often confined to long-standing
issues, they indicate growing sensitivity about market access
as global economic activity weakens, regional cycles diverge
and current account imbalances increase.,>200 It remains to be
seen, however, whether the international trading system will
hold out of a true willingness to adhere to the principles of
liberalization, or if the participation of the less affluent
countries continues to be regarded as a "necessary evil" to
preclude exclusion from the system. The greatest danger to the
system still lies in the economic and political might of the
developing countries, which might or might not remain
committed to upholding the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism when a panel decision runs contrary their national
or policy interests. The clash between the U.S. and the EU

199. Islam, supra note 196, at 61.
200. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, OVERVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL TRADING ENVIRONMENT, ANNUAL REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL,
4 WTIl'PRlOVl4 (Trade Policy Review Body, November 30, 1998).
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over the European practice of granting preference to its former
Mrican, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) colonies for imports of
bananas will determine whether selective compliance - or
conversely "enlightened unilateralism" within the system will be tolerated or not. 201
Finally, a caveat and disclaimer. The arguments made in this
article are not meant to disparage the efforts of the WTO
member countries to build a working trade order founded on
the fundamental principles of free and fair trade. The WTO
framework and its evolutionary dispute settlement mechanism
are legal devices that would have been unthinkable in the
postwar era when the GATT was established. Yet history
cannot be written, or rewritten solely for the benefit of those
who write and enjoy the rules. This article has sought to
illustrate that there is a world of a difference between the
"virtual reality" formulated by this global trade architecture,
and the cold reality that nonetheless dictates the trade
behavior of the countries that constitute the system in its
actual, working form.

201. Banana-trade Split, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, January 11, 1999, at 49.
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